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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is based on a presentation made at the New York Stock Exchange Conference 
on the Future of Global Equity Trading, March 12, 2004, Sarasota, FL. 
 
Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm?  The dramatic increase in cross-listed 
securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the 
1990s capital markets.  The bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis was one of the 
more intriguing theories to surface to explain the phenomenon.  Cross-listing, the 
hypothesis suggested, might be a bonding mechanism by which firms, incorporated in a 
jurisdiction with “weak protection” of minority shareholder rights or poor enforcement 
mechanisms, could voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and 
stricter enforcement of the US markets in order to attract investors.  By focusing on 
shareholder protection as key to cross-listing, the bonding hypothesis became 
inextricably linked to an important and influential body of academic work, the “law and 
finance” literature. 
As intriguing as the bonding hypothesis is, this article argues that it offers only a partial 
explanation for the cross-listing phenomenon in the United States in the 1990s.   Largely 
overlooked has been the main motor driving the exponential growth of cross-listings on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ in the 1990s:  Canadian-based interlisted corporations (CBIs).  
CBIs form the largest single group of interlisted foreign corporations in the United 
States, by a huge margin, representing over 25% all interlistings on the NYSE, NMS-
NASDAQ and AMEX in 2004.   In fact, Canadian issuers form the largest single group of 
foreign private issuers (FPIs) in the United States,  period.  In 2004, there were nearly 
five times as many Canadian FPIs as the next largest national group, United Kingdom 
issuers.  
 The bonding hypothesis does not explain CBIs easily.  CBIs do not come from a “weak 
investor protection” jurisdiction and, for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways, 
tend not to “signal” their entry into the US market.  Rather than “bonding”, CBIs have 
been adroitly exploiting what financial economists have described as the “home bias”  of 
U.S portfolio investors.  CBIs have been, at least until very recently, chameleons, 
deliberately blending into the woodwork of the US markets. 
This article will look at what makes CBIs different from most other interlisted companies 
and why the bonding hypothesis may not be explanatory of their behavior.  In doing so, 
the article questions some of the underlying assumptions of the law and finance literature 
2which supports the bonding hypothesis.  Finally, the article considers implications of the 
CBI experience which may merit further consideration going forward. 
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I.  Introduction 
Looking back, was it a momentary enthusiasm? 1 The dramatic increase in cross-listed 
securities, particularly in the United States, was one of the remarkable phenomena of the 
 
1 In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment, delisting by non-U.S. issuers from U.S. exchanges has become a 
prominent issue of the day.  Between 1990 and 1999, 10 foreign firms deregistered with the U.S. SEC, 
whereas between 2000 to 2005, 110 firms deregistered.  See Andras Marosi & Nadia Ziad Massoud, “You 
Can Enter but You Cannot Leave...” – U.S. Securities Markets and Foreign Firms, Table 1, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=882152, (February 2006).  According to the Wall Street Journal, $9 out of 
every $10 raised by foreign companies through new stock offerings in 2000 was done in New York rather 
than London or Luxembourg.  “By 2005, the reverse was true:  Nine of every 10 dollars was raised through 
new company listings in London or Luxembourg, the biggest spread favoring London since 1990.” See 
31990s capital markets.  In the ten year period from 1990 to 2000, the number of foreign 
corporations listed on the two main U.S. exchanges increased 450%.2 In the same ten 
year period, American Depositary Receipt programs increased over 500%.3 Listing and 
trading in the United States by non-U.S. issuers is often by way of American Depositary 
Receipts, or “ADRs”, a form of derivative security.4 Leading the charge, it appeared, 
were Latin American issuers.5
New York Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings, WALL ST. J., Thursday, January 26, 2006, at C1.  The 
pressure, primarily from European issuers already listed in the United States, to permit non-U.S. 
corporations to delist and terminate their reporting obligations with the U.S. SEC, has been so intense as to 
prompt a proposed rule change by the SEC.  Currently deregistration of a non-U.S. issuer is permitted only 
if it has fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders under rules adopted in 1964 and last amended in 1983.  Under the 
proposed rule, a non-U.S. company that is listed in its home country would be able to terminate the SEC 
registration of its shares if it has been registered for two years, has filed all required SEC reports, has not 
offered its securities in the U.S. market for a year (including in a Rule 144A transaction or other private 
placement) and meets one of two quantitative tests:  (i) 5%  or less of its public float is held by U.S. 
residents; or (ii) if a well known seasoned issuer, 10% of its public float is held by U.S. residents provided 
that 5% or less of worldwide trading volume ins in the Untied States.  See Termination of a Foreign Private 
Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities under Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports under Section 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-53020; International Series Release No. 
1295; File No. S7-12-05, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-53020.pdf (February 28, 2006).  
2See JOHN C. COFFEE, COMPETITION AMONG SECURITIES MARKETS: A PATH DEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE, at 
18 (Colum. L. &  Econ., Working Paper No. 192, 2002).  
 3 Id. at 17.  STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., STOCK MARKETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES, at 17 (World Bank 
Financial Sector Discussion Paper No. 5, Sep. 2000). 
4 “ADRs were developed by JP Morgan in 1927 as a vehicle for investors to register and earn dividends on  
non-U.S. stock without direct access to the overseas market itself.  U.S. depositary banks hold …overseas 
securities in custody in the country of origin and convert all dividends and other payments into U.S. dollars 
to receipt holders in the United States.  Investors, therefore, bear all currency risk and indirectly pay fees to 
the depositary bank.  Each depositary receipt denotes shares that represent a specific number of underlying 
shares in the home market, and new receipts can be created by the bank for investors when the requisite 
number of shares are [sic] deposited in their custodial account in the home market.  Cancellations or 
redemptions of ADRs simply reverse the process.”  See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The 
Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices:  Evidence from Foreign Stocks 
Listing in the United States, 54 J. FIN. 981, 983 (1999). 
4 “ADRs were developed by JP Morgan in 1927 as a vehicle for investors to register and earn dividends on 
no-U.S. stock without direct access to the overseas market itself. U.S. depositary banks hold that overseas 
securities in custody in the country of origin and convert all dividends and other payments into U.S. dollars 
to receipt holders in the United States. Investors, therefore, bear all currency risk and indirectly pay fees to 
the depositary bank. Each depositary receipt denotes shares that represent a specific number of underlying 
shares in the home market, and new receipts can be created by the bank for investors when the requisite 
number of shares are deposited in their custodial account in the home market. Cancellations or redemptions 
of ADRs simply reverse the process.” See Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market 
Segmentation and investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the 
United States, 54 J. FIN. 981, 983 (1999). 
 
5 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 17. 
4The cross-listing phenomenon attracted a considerable amount of academic scrutiny, 
primarily among financial economists.6 The endeavor was to determine the motivations 
 
6 Forrester & Karolyi, supra note 4; Carol A. Frost, Elizabeth Gordon, & Andrew Hayes, Stock Exchange 
Disclosure and Market Development: An Analysis of 50 International Exchanges, J. ACCT. RES. (June, 
2006).  Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 
75 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2005); Magnus Dahlquist, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 
Corporate Governance and the Home Bias, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 87 (2003); Nuno G. 
Fernandes & Miguel A. Ferreira, Does International Cross-listing Really Improve the Information 
Environment?, EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=676653 (January 
2006); Craig Doidge, Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth 
more?, Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8538.pdf; Shmuel Baruch, Andrew 
Karolyi & Michael Lemmon, Multi-Market Trading and Liqudity: Theory and Evidence at 
http://home.business.utah.edu/finsb/BaruchKarolyiLemmon%20_June%201_2005.pdf; KATHERINE SMITH 
& GEORGE SOFIANOS, THE IMPACT OF AN NYSE LISTING ON THE GLOBAL TRADING OF NON-U.S. STOCKS,
(NYSE Working Paper 97-02, June 1997), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/wp97-02.pdf; SERGI 
SARKISSIAN & MICHAEL SCHILL, ARE THERE PERMANENT VALUATION GAINS TO OVERSEAS LISTING?
EVIDENCE FROM MARKET SEQUENCING AND SELECTION, (Working Paper July 26, 2005), available at 
http://neumann.hec.ca/cref/sem/documents/051007.pdf (an older copy is EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings 
Paper No. 4491, Darden School of Business, Working Paper No. 03-03, July 25, 2003, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=395140); CRAIG ANDREW DOIDGE, GEORGE ANDREW KAROLYI, KARL V.LINS,
DARIUS P. MILLER & RENÉ M. STULZ, PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL, OWNERSHIP, AND THE CROSS-
LISTING DECISION, (NBER Working Paper No. W11162 March 2005), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=679321; Pamela Moulton & Li Wei, A Tale of Two Time Zones: Cross-Listed 
Stock Liquidity and the Availability of Substitutes (September 19, 2005), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=807704; LUZI HAIL & CHRISTIAN LEUZ, COST OF CAPITAL AND CASH FLOW 
EFFECTS OF U.S. CROSS-LISTINGS, (UPenn Wharton, Working Paper), available at 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/weiss/conf_papers/HL%20ADRs%20Apr05.pdf;  
WARREN B. BAILEY, GEORGE ANDREW KAROLYI & CAROLINA SALVA, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
INCREASED DISCLOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTINGS, (Dice Center, Working Paper 
No. 2002-4; AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings, February 2005), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=304560; Kent Baker, Jon Nofsinger & Daniel Weaver, International Cross-listing 
and Visibility, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 37, at 495, (2002); Rene Stulz, Why are foreign firms 
listed in the U.S. worth more?, 71(2)J. FIN. ECON., at 205 (2004);  Vihang Errunza & Darius Miller, Market 
segmentation and the cost of capital in international equity markets, 35(4) J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS, at 577 (2000); Andrew Karolyi, Why do companies list shares abroad? A survey of the evidence 
and its managerial implications, vol. 7 Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, Blackwell: Boston, 
1998; MICHAEL KING & DAN SEGAL, INTERNATIONAL CROSS LISTING AND THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS,
(Bank of Canada, Working Paper No. 2004-17, May 2004), available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=555953.; Dong Wook Lee, Why Does Shareholder Wealth Increase When Non-
U.S. Firms Announce Their Listing in the U.S.? (August 2004), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=422960; Christian Leuz, Discussion of ADRs, Analysts, and accuracy: Does 
Cross-lisitng in the Untied States improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value?, 
41 J. ACCT. RES. 347 (2003); Darius Miller, The market reaction to international cross-listings:  Evidence 
form depositary receipts, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (1999); William Reese & Michael Weisbach, Protection of 
minority shareholder interests , cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings, 66 J. 
Fin. Econ. 65 (2002); SERGEI SARKISSIAN & MICHAEL J. SCHILL, ARE THERE PERMANENT VALUATION 
GAINS TO OVERSEAS LISTINGS? EVIDENCE FROM MARKET SEQUENCING AND SELECTION, (Darden School of 
Business, Working Paper No. 03-03; EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4491, July 25, 2003), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=395140.   
5and significance of the marked surge in cross-listings.  Why was there this sudden 
interest by non-US firms in listing in the United States?  What was the significance  for 
the U.S. markets? The home markets? International markets?  
 
A number of explanations for the cross-listing phenomenon  were posited, the most 
traditional of which is sometimes referred to as the “market segmentation” theory; by 
cross-listing, issuers increase liquidity and deepen the pool for their securities, leading to 
increased share valuations, both abroad and at home.7 Other hypotheses linked product 
market expansion with the cross-listing of securities by a manufacturer or service 
provider. 8 Simple geographic proximity was also suggested as a reason 9 Sarkissian 
and Schill, in examining all cross-listed companies  on the major world exchanges, found 
“strong evidence that cross-listing clusters regionally.”11 Although they were unable to 
discriminate among the underlying causes of their results, geographic, cultural, economic, 
and industrial proximity were all supported by their findings.12 Coffee has, in retrospect, 
suggested that the rise in interest of cross-listings on NASDAQ during the 1990s might 
have been merely a  side-effect of the technology bubble.13 A more prosaic explanation 
of the exponential rise in foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange during the 
same period might be the persuasive marketing efforts of the Exchange itself, which 
 
7 See DP Miller, The Market Reaction to International Cross-listings:  Evidence from Depository Receipts,
51 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (1999); see Stephen R. Foerster & G. Andrew Karolyi, The Effects of Market 
Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the 
United States, J. FIN. 54 (3), 981-1013 (1999).   
8 Foerster & Karolyi also found support for such a theory, id. at 4.  
9 Sergei Sarkissian & Michael J. Schill, The Overseas Listing Decision: New Evidence of Proximity and 
Preference, 17(3) THE REVIEW OF FIN. STUDIES 769 (2004). 
10 See, e.g., LINDA L. TESAR & INGRID M. WERNER, HOME BIAS AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITIES 
MARKETS  (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper no. 4218, 1992). 
11 Sarkissian & Schill, supra note 9, at 3. 
12 Id. at 54. 
6together with accommodations provided to non-US issuers to the listing rules (discussed 
infra) made cross-listing a more attractive proposition. 14 
Among the copious literature on the cross-listing phenomenon, the bonding hypothesis 
was one of the more intriguing theories to surface.15 “A newer interpretation is today 
emerging that cross-listing may also be a bonding mechanism by which firms 
incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection of minority rights or poor enforcement 
mechanisms can voluntarily subject themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter 
enforcement in order to attract investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest (or 
 
13 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 54. 
14 In the late 1980s, the New York Stock Exchange set about identifying non-U.S. issuers, particularly 
Canadian issuers,  which would meet its listing criteria in an effort to promote new listings.  Conversation 
with Robert G. Britz, New York Stock Exchange, New York, NY (1989).  Recognizing the functional 
equivalence of foreign corporate governance mechanisms, The New York Stock Exchange has provided 
regulatory accommodations for non-U.S. issuers which continue to this day. The relevant rules are to be 
found in s. 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual.  Foreign private issuers, as defined by rule 3b-4 
under the Exchange Act, are permitted to follow home country practice instead of the provisions listed in 
303A with the following exceptions:  such companies are required to comply with the requirements of 
s.303A.06 (must have an audit committee that satisfies the requirements of 10A-3 of the Exchange Act), 
303A.11 (must disclose any significant ways that their corporate governance practices differ from those 
required by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards), 303A.12(b) (the CEO must promptly 
notify the NYSE in writing after any executive officer becomes aware of any material non-compliance with 
the applicable provisions of 303A), and 303A.12(c) (must submit an executed written affirmation annually 
to the NYSE, and an interim affirmation whenever a change occurs to the board or any committees subject 
to 303A). Additionally, in 1994 a longstanding debate over “one share/one vote” was resolved by SEC 
Rule 19c-4 which required stock exchange rules to preclude domestic listed issuers from creating disparate 
voting structures.  However, the rule did not preclude initial public offerings of dual class shares nor the 
initial listing of companies with existing dual class shares listed elsewhere.  “Most other jurisdictions 
around the world seem to have few restrictions on issuing dual-class stock.”  Second Class Investors – The 
use and abuse of subordinated shares in Canada, Shareholder Association for Research and Education, 
Vancouver, Canada, April 2004, at 10; See ALSO ANETE PAJUSTE, DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE UNIFICATION OF DUAL-CLASS SHARES, (European Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 465, March 
2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id 683158 and http://www.ecb.int.  The dual class share 
structure is now making its appearance in U.S. domestic listed companies; Google is a prime example. 
15 See Coffee, supra note 2; Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641 (1999). See also Rene Stultz, 
Globalization, Corporate Finance and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 9 (1999); OWEN 
FUERST, A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTOR PROTECTION REGULATIONS ARGUMENT FOR 
GLOBAL LISTING OF STOCKS (Working Paper, 1998); MICHAEL R. KING & DAN SEGAL, INTERNATIONAL 
CROSS-LISTING AND THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS (Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2004-17, May 2004). 
7who would discount such stocks to reflect the risk of minority expropriation)”.16 The 
bonding, or corporate governance, hypothesis for cross-listing was “consistent with a new 
academic literature that argues that liquid and deep securities markets can develop only in 
jurisdictions that protect the rights and expectations of minority shareholders”.17 
As the bonding hypothesis was picked up and examined,  it came to stand for the 
proposition that the “principal motivation for cross-listing is investor protection.”18 Firms 
“from countries with poor protection of minority shareholders signal their desire to 
respect rights of shareholders by listing in a jurisdiction with higher scrutiny, tougher 
regulation and better enforcement.”19 And so, the bonding hypothesis became 
inextricably linked to an important and influential body of academic literature often 
referred to as the “law and finance” literature.20 
As intriguing as the bonding hypothesis is, this article argues that it offers only a partial 
explanation for the cross-listing phenomenon in the United States in the 1990s.   Largely 
overlooked was the main motor driving the exponential growth of cross-listings on the 
 
16 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 11.  “Bonding” is a term of art in modern institutional law and economics. It 
refers to the costs or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors that it will 
perform as promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher price. The paradigmatic 
example would be the surety bond purchased by the agent and protecting its shareholder principals. The 
term was coined in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); See Coffee, supra note 2, at fn. 22. 
17 See Coffee, supra note 2, at 4-5. “The seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 
(“LLS&V”) has established the existence of two rival structures of share ownership – dispersed ownership 
and concentrated ownership, and that the structure of share ownership in a given jurisdiction correlates with 
significant differences in the legal protection provided to minority shareholders.” See also Coffee, supra 
note 2, at fn. 10. 
18 See King & Segal, infra note 21, at 1. 
19 Id. An interesting analogy, brought to the author’s attention by Professor Thomas Cotter, is to the U.S. 
patent system.  Clarisa Long has written about patents as signals; companies want to convey credible 
private information about their value by registering a patent in the United States.  See Patent Signals, 69(2) 
U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002).   
8NYSE and NASDAQ in the 1990s:  Canadian-based interlisted corporations (CBIs, in the 
jargon of the Toronto Stock Exchange).21 The bonding hypothesis does not explain 
CBIs easily.  Rather than “bonding”, CBIs have been adroitly exploiting what financial 
economists have described as the “home bias”  of U.S portfolio investors. 
 
This article will look at what makes CBIs different from most other interlisted companies 
and why the bonding hypothesis may not be explanatory of their behavior.  In doing so, 
the article questions some of the underlying assumptions of the law and finance literature 
which supports the bonding hypothesis.  Finally, the article considers implications of the 
CBI experience which may merit further consideration going forward. 
 
II.  Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis 
 
CBIs form the largest single group of interlisted foreign corporations in the United States, 
by a huge margin: 189 corporations at the end of 2004 representing over 25% of all 
interlistings on the NYSE, NMS-NASDAQ and AMEX. 22 In fact, Canadian issuers 
form the largest single group of foreign private issuers (FPIs)23 in the United States,  
 
20 See Coffee, supra note 2; see also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, Law and Finance, 
156(2) INT’L. LIBRARY OF CRITICAL WRITINGS IN ECON. 435 (2003). 
21 This paper, in fact, originated as a commentary to one of the few academic articles to look specifically at 
CBIs. MICHAEL R. KING & DAN SEGAL, INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTING AND THE BONDING HYPOTHESIS,
(Bank of Canada, Working Paper No. 2004-17, May 2004), available at SSRN, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=555953; See Sarkassian, supra note 6; see Usha R. Mittoo, infra note 27. 
22 NYSE 18.6%; AMEX 86.6% ; NMS NASDAQ 22.4%.  For the Nasdaq Stock Market –Small Cap 
Market and Over-the-Counter market, the percentages represented by Canadian FPIs are even more 
striking: 48.9% and 63.6%, respectively.  Foreign Companies registered and reporting with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, Office of International Corporate Finance (December 31, 
2004).  
23 "Foreign private issuer" (“FPI”) is defined in Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240. 3b-4) and 
Rule 405 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230. 405) to include all foreign issuers other than (i) foreign 
governments, and (ii) foreign issuers that have more than 50 percent of their outstanding voting securities 
9period.  In 2004, there were nearly five times as many Canadian FPIs as the next largest 
national group, United Kingdom issuers.24 Four hundred and ninety-seven (497) 
Canadian corporations were SEC reporting issuers at the end of  2004, representing 40% 
of FPIs registered and reporting in the United States.25 Over the period 1990 to 2003, 
Canadian issuers accounted for 40 % of public offerings in the United States by  non-U.S. 
issuers.26 
None of this might be surprising, given the geographic proximity of the two countries and 
the increasing degree of economic integration.  But in the literature examining the cross-
listing phenomenon, the role of CBIs has been often overlooked. 27 There are some 
reasons for this.  
 
It is actually surprising, though, that cross-listing in the United States is such a recent 
phenomenon for CBIs, given the geographic proximity to the United States (which has 
not changed over the past two centuries). 28 Economic integration is not a completely 
new development either.   Be that as it may, between 1928 and 1976, only four Canadian 
 
held of record by U. S. residents and that also have: U. S. citizens or residents making up a majority of their 
executive officers and directors; more than 50 percent of their assets located in the United States; or their 
business administered principally in the United States.  See 17 CFR 240, 3b-4; 17 CFR 230.450.  
24 Supra note 22.  Interestingly, Israeli issuers form the third largest national group of FPIs, and, for 
purposes of this paper, demonstrate the greatest similarity with Canadian issuers.  
25 Id. 
26 Canada represents over 40% of English common law cross-listings.  See W.A. Reese, Jr. & Michael S. 
Weisbach , Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and 
Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65, at Table 2 (2002).  
27 See King & Segal, supra note 21; Usha R. Mittoo, Globalization and the Value of U.S. Listing: Revisiting 
Canadian Evidence, 27:9 J. BANKING & FIN. 1629;  JORDAN I. SIEGEL, CAN FOREIGN FIRMS BOND 
THEMSELVES EFFECTIVELY BY RENTING U.S. SECURITIES LAWS? (AFA 2003 Washington DC Meetings, 
March 2004). 
28 See Sarkissian & Schill, supra note 9.   
10
corporations listed on the NYSE .29 In the 1980s, that number doubled (nine NYSE 
listings); NASDAQ saw 12 “listings” during that period 30. In the 1990s the pace of 
cross-listing accelerated: there were five times as many listings by CBIs on the NYSE as 
in the 1980s (forty-five) and forty-three listings on NASDAQ.  In the period of 2000 to 
2005, forty-five CBIs were listed on the NYSE and twenty-nine on NASDAQ.31 
So, why does the bonding hypothesis not adequately explain this sudden interest by CBIs 
in cross-listing in the United States?  CBIs are unlike other foreign issuers for which the 
bonding hypothesis has been developed. 32 The case of  CBIs, however,  also throws into 
relief some of the assumptions which have supported, not just the bonding hypothesis, 
but a wider variety of theories about the nature and behavior of non-US issuers, and in 
particular, the level of protections afforded their investors.33 These assumptions merit, 
and have been receiving, a closer look34, and not just as they may be applicable (or 
inapplicable) to CBIs.   
 
III.  Uniquely Canadian 
 
29 The four Canadian listings on the NYSE are: (1)Inco. Ltd. in 1928, (2)Alcan Inc. in 1950, (3)Nortel 
Network Corp. in 1975, and (4)BCE Incorporation in 1976. (Data obtained from the NYSE websites.)  See 
infra Appendix 1.  
30At the time NASDAQ was a quotations system, not an exchange. 
31 Data obtained from the NYSE and NASDAQ websites. See infra Appendix 2.
32 Israeli companies are, on the other hand, quite like CBIs.  Amir Licht has documented the practices of 
Israeli companies; see Licht, infra note 145. 
33 These assumptions arise out of the now prolific  works by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer,  & Robert Vishny. (“LLS&V”).  See e.g., Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. 
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta, et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 
(2001). 
34 See  Djankov, et al, infra note 147. 
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In addition to their dominating presence among non-U.S. issuers listing in the United 
States, CBIs are unique in a number of other ways.  CBIs have almost never used 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in order to enter the U.S. markets.35 There is 
seamless, instantaneous, currency conversion between the Canadian and U.S. dollar; 
currency conversion is one of the marketing features associated with the use of ADRs.  
Canada is the dominant trading partner with the United States under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);36 the level of integration of trade in goods and services 
is very high.  Finally, and for purposes of this analysis, perhaps most importantly, CBIs, 
unlike other issuers, have the benefit of regulatory choice in entering the U.S. market.37 
A.  ADRs and Canadian Issuers 
 
ADRs are a form of derivative security developed by bank intermediaries based in the 
United States to facilitate U.S. trading in foreign securities.38 Canadian issuers have 
virtually never used ADRs as a trading or listing vehicle. Difficulties associated with 
clearing and settlement procedures and currency conversion, both major factors originally 
justifying the expense and additional complexity of ADRs, were not compelling in the 
case of Canadian securities.  In addition, the long familiarity of both Canadian issuers and 
 
35 In fact, there have been two issues of ADRs by CBIs according to NYSE statistics; see infra Appendix 1. 
36 In 2003, the total trade between the United States and Canada amounted to 391,523.4 million dollars.  
The total trade between the United States and Mexico (the United States’ second biggest trading partner) 
for the same year came to 231,471.8 million dollars.  For 2004, as of June, the trade in goods between the 
United States and Canada made up 20.0 % of the United States’ total trade in goods while trade between 
the United States and Mexico made up 11.8 % of this total.   These statistics come from the U.S Census 
Bureau website. See Usha Mittoo, supra note 27.
37 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
Theoretical Inquiries L 387 (2001); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, Theoretical Inquiries L 563 
(2001); Mary S. Head & Roberta S. Karmel, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S. Markets, 24 LAW &
POL’Y. IN INT’L. BUS., at 199 (1993). 
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their financial intermediaries with the U.S. market meant that the ADR product held little 
attraction for them. 
 
There are two implications for this paper which arise from the fact that Canadian issuers 
do not use ADRs.  The first implication  is that many of the studies looking at FPIs in the 
U.S. markets and cross-listing, in particular, have simply overlooked the most important 
subset of the market, Canadian issuers, because the data supporting the research is based 
on the existence of an ADR program.39 The use of ADRs by foreign issuers in the United 
States has been so widespread, and the data associated with their use so visible, that some 
studies assume that ADRs represent the entire, or at least, most significant, universe of 
foreign issuers in the United States. 40 
The second implication goes directly to the heart of the bonding hypothesis.  Because 
Canadian issuers do not use ADRs to list or trade their securities in the United States, 
their securities are, on their face, indistinguishable from those of domestic U. S. issuers.   
There is no “ADR” moniker to raise the red flag of “foreign private issuer”; the securities 
do not “signal” to the market.    
 
Furthermore, CBIs deliberately avoid signaling.  Distinguishing features in the corporate 
names of the older, established CBIs tend to disappear upon entry into the U.S. market; 
Bell Canada Enterprises becomes BCE; Bank of Montreal becomes BMO Group; 
 
38 See supra note 2.  
39 Id. See generally Jerry Feigen, Potential Exiting Through ADRs (and/or GDRs?) for International 
Private Equity Investor, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 109 (1997); Joseph Velli: American Depository Receipts: 
An Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 38 (1994); Bruce L. Hertz, American Depository Receipts,
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Toronto Dominion Bank becomes TD (as in TD Waterhouse, now TD Ameritrade). As 
for more recently established corporations, national or geographic identifiers are not 
there; RIM did not choose to call itself  “BlackBerry of Canada”. 41 The CBIs are 
deliberately opting for a strategy of blending into the woods of the U.S. domestic 
marketplace.  
 
This chameleon-like behavior is one factor which undermines the bonding hypothesis, in 
so far as it might have been applicable to CBIs.  CBIs are not signaling to the market in a 
way predicted by the bonding hypothesis; quite the contrary.42 
B. Regulatory Choice 
Unlike other FPIs, many  Canadian issuers also have a greater choice of  regulatory 
regime when it comes to entering the United States, through a listing or otherwise.  
Currently, there are three different regulatory options available to the larger Canadian 
issuers raising capital or listing in the United States.  Over the decades, Canadian issuers 
 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 600 
PLI/Comm 237 (1992).  
40 Id.  
41 It is likely that only the unfortunate, and extremely high profile, encounter with the vagaries of the U.S. 
patent system brought public attention to RIM’s country of origin.  In this regard, there may be another 
interesting analogy to patent law.  Moore’s article discusses patents and xenophobia; foreign companies 
register a large number of patents in the U.S. but, proportionally, lose their infringement cases more 
frequently.  See Kimberly Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. Rev. 1497 (2003).  
RIM’s very public woes over its patent disputes (any publicity is good publicity) may be leading to a 
change in strategy for subsequent CBIs listing in the United States.  Tim Horton’s, a donut/light meal 
chain, is an icon in Canada, but relatively unknown in the United States.  It listed on the NYSE very shortly 
after RIM settled its infamous patent dispute in early 2006.  The NYSE took out a full page ad in the Wall 
Street Journal to trumpet the Tim Horton listing.  The  headline ran:  “T HE NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE.  NOW SERVING CANADA’S FRESHEST NEW LISTING”.  The layout and style of the 
ad was evocative of a similar full page ad published in the Wall Street Journal a few days earlier by RIM 
(which is listed on NASDAQ).  Is the implication that  that coffee and donuts are as essential to the 
functioning of the US economy as the ubiquitous BlackBerry?  See WALL ST. J., Thursday, March 30, 
2006,  at A7. 
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have always been identified by the SEC as a case apart; foreign, yes, but not quite foreign 
enough43 
1. The Canadian Issuer as U.S. Issuer 
 
Canadian issuers can always choose to register and report as a domestic U.S. issuer, 
subject to the same rules and oversight as any other U.S. issuer.  In fact, for decades, 
Canadian issuers were required to do so; they did not benefit from accommodations 
provided by the SEC to non-U.S. issuers.44 
Some Canadian issuers have deliberately made this decision, despite the duplication and 
costs associated with compliance with different regulatory and accounting requirements.  
For some CBIs, the costs were outweighed by a possible marketing advantage of being 
perceived as a U.S. issuer.45 Over the years, these Canadian issuers may even lose their 
status as a FPI, as the majority of trading in their equity securities migrates to the United 
States 46 
42 On the other hand, from an investor’s rather than an issuer’s point of view, by blending into the U.S. 
market, CBIs may be producing a similar effect to FPIs using ADRs to signal to the market.  
43 For many years after the introduction of the “F-series” forms, which provide certain exemptions to FPIs 
from U.S. disclosure obligations, Canadian issuers were excluded by an instruction in the 20-F Form and 
required to file as domestic U.S. issuers. See also Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4708, 29 FR 9828 
(July 9, 1964).   Since 1991, Canadian issuers have been permitted to use the “F-series” forms  See SEC 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting System for 
Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July 1, 1991)(announcing the adoption of revisions to existing rules 
and forms to permit registration and reporting under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 by Canadian foreign private issuers on the same basis as other foreign private issuers). 
44 Id. 
45 Nortel, for example, has never filed F-series forms. 
46 In 2004, twenty-one Canadian companies filed S-1 forms and sixty Canadian companies filed 10-K 
forms.  These statistics are compiled from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website at 
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar.  See infra Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.
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 2. The Canadian Issuer as FPI 
 
Since 1991, a second, previously closed, route is open to Canadian issuers registering 
securities with the SEC, the “F-series” of foreign issuer registration and reporting 
forms.47 Usage of these forms clearly identifies the issuer as a foreign issuer and 
provides certain accommodations with respect to line item disclosure (for example, with 
respect to individual executive compensation), financial reporting (reconciliation to US 
GAAP), the use of home country reporting for continuous disclosure and an exemption 
from US proxy and short swing profit rules.  Insofar as regulatory filings with the SEC, 
although not the actual form of the security, the decision to use the F-series forms would 
place a CBI on common footing with other foreign private issuers using ADRs as their 
US trading vehicle.48 For investors not delving into the regulatory filings too deeply, 
however, the securities themselves, as listed or traded, would still not be “signaling” to 
the market, given that they are not identified as ADRs. 
 
3. The Canadian Issuer as Canadian Issuer 
The third registration and reporting option open to certain Canadian issuers is the 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS), specifically negotiated between the SEC 
and Canadian regulators over a five year-period and implemented in 1991.49 Despite its 
name, the system is bilateral, not multilateral, and so exclusively available to Canadian 
 
47 See supra note 23.  
48 Id.  In 2004, 252 Canadian companies filed 20-F forms.  This statistic is from the SEC website at 
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar.  See infra Appendix 5.  
49 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July 1, 1991). 
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issuers entering the U.S. capital markets (and vice versa).50 The system had originally 
envisaged the participation of the United Kingdom which dropped out of negotiations at 
an early stage.51 
The MJDS is based on principles of mutual recognition, similar to those operating 
between member states in the European Union and is largely supported by a high degree 
of harmonization of regulatory frameworks in the U.S. and Canada.  Although based on 
principles of mutuality, which would envisage entry of U.S. issuers into Canada under the 
system as well as Canadian issuers into the United States, the system in operation has 
been virtually a one-way street, running north-south.52 
Implementation of the MJDS coincides with the exponential growth of NYSE and 
NASDAQ listings by CBIs in the 1990s.  Coincidence?  However, the basic premise of 
the MJDS is somewhat at odds with the tenets of the bonding hypothesis.  CBIs making 
use of the MJDS are not subjecting themselves to the rigors of SEC oversight and the 
entire panoply of U.S. investor protection mechanisms.  They are not “bonding”.   
 
The whole thrust of the MJDS is to permit Canadian issuers to enter the U.S. market, 
using Canadian disclosure documentation and subject to the immediate oversight of 
 
50 Only a handful of US issuers have entered the Canadian market using the MJDS; see infra note 52. 
 51 The SEC indicated its intention to extend it to other foreign countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Japan. See EDWARD E. GREENE ET. AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES MARKETS 8-5 (3d ed. 1995). 
52 In 2004, there were approximately 152 Canadian MJDS filers with the SEC, using the special form 40-F; 
in contrast, for the same period, there were only seven  U.S. issuers filing MJDS to enter Canadian markets. 
Statistics are compiled from the SEC data on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar.  
See infra Appendix 6.   
17
Canadian regulators, not the SEC.53 The purpose of the MJDS was to promote ease of 
access  and to avoid the costs of regulatory duplication.   Canadian issuers using the 
MJDS to enter the United States are neither intending to, nor in fact,  “signaling” 
adherence to “higher” U.S. standards of investor protection , tougher regulation or higher 
regulatory scrutiny.  54 
There are two caveats, however, which modulate the MJDS system.  The MJDS is a 
complex, bilateral, regulatory initiative which even at the outset demonstrated certain 
asymmetric features that detracted from principles of “pure” mutual recognition.  For 
example, the SEC insisted on retaining the possibility of U.S. liability attaching to a 
disclosure document prepared under Canadian rules and subject to Canadian regulatory 
oversight. 55 This particular asymmetry clearly undermines operation of principles of 
mutual recognition which would have recognized the operation of Canadian liability 
under Canadian standards and interpretation.  Another, similar, asymmetry was the 
requirement for full reconciliation of financial statements for certain offerings (primarily 
equity offerings), to U.S. GAAP.56 
The second caveat arises from the first, at least in part.  The potential for U.S. liability 
attaching to Canadian disclosure documentation left Canadian issuers particularly open to 
arguments (usually, of U.S. counsel) suggesting that, despite the ability to use Canadian 
disclosure in the United States, the more prudent course would be to meet both Canadian 
 
53 The SEC did retain a certain amount of discretion to exercise, on an exceptional basis, residual oversight 
of Canadian issuers’ MJDS offerings.   
54 See Hal S. Scott, The Future Content of the U.S. Securities Laws: Internationalization of Primary Public  
Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 82 (2000) (describing SEC’s attempts to eliminate the 
MJDS program and quoting Edward Alden, Canadians Mobilise Over Loss of MJDS, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
1999, at 34).  
55 See supra note 49. 
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and U.S. disclosure standards.  This argument further buttressed arguments  (usually, of 
U.S. investment bankers) suggesting that Canadian-style disclosure be made to look more 
like U.S disclosure, for marketing, not regulatory, reasons.  Thus, Canadian prospectuses 
used in MJDS transactions began to look more and more, in style and substance, like U.S.  
issuer prospectuses, despite the fact that, technically, they were not required to comply 
with U.S. line item disclosure.  In an interesting twist, the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP 
requirement (where equity securities have been issued under the MJDS) has resulted in 
the major CBIs (the big Canadian banks) lobbying, successfully, for the acceptance of US 
GAAP in Canada in fulfillment of Canadian regulatory requirements, thus avoiding the 
expense and complications of reconciliation in the United States 57 
56 See supra note 49. 
57 Section 70 of the Regulations currently stipulates that the financial statements referred to in section 155 
of the Canada Business Corporations Act (“CBCA”) must be prepared in accordance with generally-
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as set out in the Handbook of the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants. Section 71 of the Regulations provides that the auditor's report referred to in section 169 of 
the Canada Business Corporations Act must be prepared in accordance with generally-accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS) as set out in the Handbook of the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants.  In 2004, the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”) released the National 
Instrument 52-107: Acceptable Accounting Principles, Auditing Standards and Reporting Currencies, NI 
52-107 (January 16, 2004).  The regulatory amendments are designed to harmonize sections 70 and 71 of 
the Regulations with the rules established by NI-52-107. NI 52-107 allows corporations registered with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to use standards recognized in the United States, i.e. 
GAAP and GAAS, for the preparation and audit of their annual and interim financial statements. NI 52-107 
applies to financial years starting January 1, 2003 and later. 
The amendments would allow CBCA corporations registered with the SEC to prepare financial 
statements according to U.S. GAAP as established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the 
United States.  CBCA corporations registered with the SEC changing from Canadian GAAP to U.S. GAAS 
would have to set relevant information in the notes of the financial statements for two years following the 
change. The notes would indicate significant differences between Canadian and U.S. GAAS concerning 
accounting, measurement and presentation.  Also, these notes would include an assessment of the impact 
resulting from any significant difference between both countries' accounting principles, as well as 
information consistent with the requirements of the Canadian GAAP. 
Corporations registered with the SEC that have produced financial statements according to both 
Canadian and U.S. GAAP for at least two years before changing to only U.S. GAAP would be required to 
include a note explaining the significant differences between the Canadian and U.S. GAAP regarding 
recognition, measurement and presentation as well as quantifying these differences.  The amendments 
would also allow CBCA corporations registered with the SEC to prepare the auditor's report mentioned in 
section 169 of the CBCA according to the GAAS established by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board of the United States.  See Industry Canada website at 
http://strategis.gc.ca/engdoc/main.html. 
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IV. Canadian-based Issuers and the Bonding Hypothesis 
Despite the asymmetries in the MJDS and their very practical consequences, the use of 
the MJDS by Canadian issuers does argue against the bonding hypothesis as an  
explanation of the exponential increase in cross-listings by Canadian issuers in the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, there has been some academic commentary wrestling to apply the bonding 
hypothesis to Canadian issuers 58 Two related assertions have been made in this context 
of applying the bonding hypothesis to CBIs:  (i) the “level of investor protection in the 
United States is qualitatively higher than in Canada” 59and (ii) the ownership structure of 
Canadian firms is more highly concentrated than in the United States.60 
These two assertions are intertwined in the bonding literature.  The bonding hypothesis 
assumes that the motivation for cross-listing is the issuer’s desire to signal its voluntary 
compliance with a “stronger” regulatory regime which provides greater investor 
protection.  An associated body of literature has observed that corporations coming from 
jurisdictions with “weaker” regimes of shareholder/investor protections tend to 
demonstrate a more highly concentrated form of ownership structure than corporations in 
the United States.61 Since Canadian corporations demonstrate a concentrated form of 
ownership structure, this may indicate “weaker” corporate governance and shareholder 
protections, thus providing the motivation to cross-list and to “bond”, the argument goes.   
Both of these assertions merit closer scrutiny. 
 
58 See King & Segal, supra note 21. 
59 Id. at 1. 
60 Id. at 2. 
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 A.  Concentrated corporate ownership patterns 
 
Beginning with the second assertion, Canadian corporations generally do demonstrate a 
more highly concentrated form of ownership than U.S. corporations.62 However, in this 
regard, the United States is clearly the exception and not the rule across jurisdictions.  To 
a greater or lesser degree, every country in the world, even the U.K. with its vibrant 
capital markets, 63 demonstrates greater concentration of corporate ownership than the 
United States. 64 By virtue of this fact, any corporation seeking to cross-list in the United 
States will likely demonstrate a more concentrated form of ownership than its similarly 
positioned U.S. peers.   
 
The prevalence of a concentrated corporate ownership structure should not be 
automatically associated with “weaker” investor/shareholder protections.  The United 
States does not have the regulatory monopoly on investor/shareholder protections, as 
discussed below.  Concentrated ownership patterns definitely do present the danger of 
minority shareholder expropriation, at the hands of the majority shareholder. However, so 
does the widely dispersed pattern of corporate ownership usually associated with United 
 
61 See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33; Coffee, supra note 2.  
62 See R. Daniels & J. MacIntosh, Towards a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime, 29 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 863 (1991). 
63 In 2003, the London Stock Exchange had more listed companies than the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and only the NYSE and the NASDAQ had greater total values of share trading for that year.  
These statistics come from the World Federation of Exchanges website at 
http://www.fibv.com/WFE/home.asp?menu=315.   
64 For statistics regarding ownership concentration in Europe, see Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, 
European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A Twelve-Country Study, J. INT’L BUS. STUDIES 28(4), at  
759-778 (1997); Marco Becht & Ailsa Roel, Blockholding in Europe:  An International Comparison, 43 
Eur. Econ. Rev. 1049  (1999) (discussing the size of block sharholdings in Europe and reporting that while 
ownership is much more dispersed in the U.K compared to continental Europe, it is still significantly 
more  highly concentrated than in the U.S.); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, Corporate 
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States capital markets, the potential expropriators being management rather than majority 
shareholders. 65 
The important point to retain in any discussion of ownership patterns and 
shareholder/investor protection is that the problem may differ, depending on the 
prevailing ownership structure.  As the problem differs, so may the solutions.  In fact, the 
perception that there even is a problem may not be one that is universally shared. 66 With 
respect to CBIs in particular, the relationship between the pattern of concentrated 
ownership and shareholder/investor protection is discussed below.67 
B. Investor protection in the United States is superior 
 
The assertion that the ownership structure of Canadian firms is more highly concentrated 
than in the United States is demonstrably true.68 The assertion that the level of investor 
protection in the United States is qualitatively higher than in Canada is not so 
demonstrably true. 69 Should the level of investor protection in Canada be equal to or 
better than in the United States, what are the implications for the bonding hypothesis and 
 
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (finding that only a few economies have many 
corporations that are widely held). 
65 Under the “agency cost” theory, managers are "agents" for the shareholders. See e.g.,  Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1263-65 (1982). See Christopher J. 
Gulinello, The Revision of Taiwan’s Company Law: The Struggle Toward a Shareholder-oriented Model in 
One Corner of East Asia, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 75, 94 (2003): “...if a concentrated-ownership system 
develops shareholder protections that deal exclusively with protection from controlling shareholder 
expropriation, then there will be risks of expropriation at the hands of management as ownership becomes 
more disperse and agency costs related to the monitoring of management increase.”  
66 Asian markets, eg Hong Kong.  Some commentators note that investors may be compensated in other 
ways where dual class voting structures, and the concomitant opportunities for minority shareholder 
expropriation, are prevalent; higher dividends, for example, in European companies or lower valuations, 
indicating that investors are getting what they pay for.  See Second Class Investors, supra note 14.   
67 See infra note 128. 
68 See King & Segal, supra note 21. 
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CBIs?  Going beyond CBIs, what may be the implications for other non-U.S. issuers 
listing on U.S. exchanges? 
 
The level of investor/shareholder protection is key to the bonding hypothesis.  It is also 
key to theories of corporate governance and the setting of international standards and 
practices associated with the bonding hypothesis.  The following discussion will 
investigate the validity of the commonly held assumption that U.S. investor/shareholder 
protections should provide the benchmark against which all others are measured and the 
backbone of international standards. It will also investigate the Canadian 
shareholder/investor protections to determine if the bonding hypothesis is explanatory of 
CBIs. 
 
V.  Testing the Bonding Hypothesis  
 
The validity of the bonding hypothesis is rooted in accepted notions of good corporate 
governance:  mechanisms will be in place to deter expropriation of investor/shareholders, 
particularly at the hands of unscrupulous managers.  An important body of economic 
literature, the LLSV studies,70 has appeared over the last decade postulating indicia of 
investor protections and gathering and comparing data across a large number of 
jurisdictions.71 The efforts have been impressive and the data accumulated formidable.  
These studies are some of the most widely cited in the area, and until very recently, their 
conclusions considered virtually self-evident and the starting point for numerous other 
 
69 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
70 See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note  33. 
23
investigations.  The findings of the LLSV studies have themselves played into the 
development of international standards of corporate governance. 
 
The comparative analysis provided by the LLSV studies, though welcome, gave some 
financial economists and legal academics pause however, and the early work is now 
being reconsidered by certain of the  original authors themselves.72 The application of a 
little comparative legal theory may unearth the source of this unease with the early LLSV 
literature which supports the bonding hypothesis.  
 
A. Complexity 
 “Legal systems are the result of a layered complexity… .”73 Legal systems evolve over 
time, inventing, adapting, borrowing, having change thrust upon them.  Statutory law, in 
particular, often contains redundancies, contradictions, and fossilized concepts or 
practices of no current significance.74 Any one legal concept in any one system, at any 
one time, exists and operates in  a complex relationship to a myriad of other concepts:  
“legal systems never are.  They always become”.75 
Statutory law is perhaps the most visible and accessible layer of any legal system.  It is 
not surprising then that financial economists, in searching for indicia of various kinds, 
 
71 Id. 
72 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, THE GREAT REVERSALS: THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH CENTURY  (CRSP Working Paper No. 526, June 2001); Mark Roe, Corporate 
Law’s Limits, 31:2 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002); Coffee, supra note 2.  
73 See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 5 (1997).  For a more detailed examination of these concepts as they are applicable to corporate 
governance mechanisms, see Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 983 (2005); Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective are Capital Markets in Exerting Governance 
on Corporations? Recent Lessons from Emerging Markets in Financial Sector Governance:  The Roles of 
the Public and Private Sectors (Washington: Brookings Press, 2002). 
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look primarily to statutory law.  Statutory law, however, may only be the tip of the 
iceberg,  indicating a large, complex, structure submerged beneath the surface.  The true 
significance of statutory law, too, may not be what it seems;  its role and importance in 
positing legal principles can vary from system to system. 76 
Adding to the complexity of the operation of “formal” normative propositions is another 
complex layer, sometimes referred to as “legal sensibilities”. 77 Legal sensibilities consist 
not only of  “rules and principles which can be cast in propositional form, but also of 
higher order understandings, received techniques, constellations of values, and shared 
ways of perceiving reality, which are pervasive, often subtle, and themselves deeply 
layered in complex and important ways”78 .  
 
This is not good news for the econometric analysis of legal concepts across a large 
number of jurisdictions, even with the use of reliable data bases and the cooperation of 
hundreds of volunteer gatherers and interpreters of data.79 Despite the extraordinary 
 
74 See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999). 
75 See Mattei, supra note 73. 
76 See Jordan, Conundrum of Corporate Governance, supra note 73; KATHARINA PISTOR AND CHENGGANG 
XU, INCOMPLETE LAW - A CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE 
EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 204, May 
2002). 
77 See Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, reprinted in LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY, at 167-234 (Basic Books, 1983). 
78 See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS, (Foundation 
Press, 6th ed., 1998).
79 Djankov et al, infra note 147, at 4:   “Our data are based on answers to a  questionnaire completed by 
attorneys from Lex Mundi law firms.  Lex Mundi is an association of international law firms with members 
in 108 countries.  We invited Lex Mundi firms to participate in the project and received complete answers 
from 102 of them.  After processing the authors’ answers, we conducted follow-up conference calls to seek 
clarifications and asked respondents to confirm our coding of the data.  The sample we use in this paper is 
based on the answers of 72 authors who have confirmed the validity of our data. The countries included in 
the sample represent 99.3% of total world market capitalization in 2003.”   Despite this impressive massing 
of resources, there are nagging difficulties associated with the collection and comparability of the data.  
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amount of information which is being made available with respect to corporate 
governance and investor protections around the world, isolating indicia of investor 
protection across jurisdictions is very hard.80 A factor which may be highly significant in 
one system may be completely lacking in another, with little or no impact on the 
effectiveness of investor protection mechanisms.   
 
Drawing indicia from corporate statutes, the easiest and most obvious source, may also 
be highly misleading, depending on the role of statutory law in  a system (peripheral, 
supplemental, fundamental) or even, simply,  the age of the statute.     Purely as a matter 
of positive law, formally recognized normative rules,  corporate law demonstrates its own  
“layered complexity”.   
 
In addition, each body of corporate law is highly path dependent,81 retaining the imprint 
of the specific historical forces which have formed it.   Also, the principles of corporate 
law have drawn  and depend upon a variety of other, older and more fundamental areas of 
the law:  property, contract,  agency or mandate, trust law, status,  procedural 
constitutional and administrative law.  Each of these other areas of law varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and differs in its importance in the operation of corporate law.  
Trust law,  the source of the concept of fiduciary duties, for example, can be completely 
absent in many legal systems, to no ill effect.  Constitutional law can play a key role in 
corporate law in some countries, in Latin America, for example.  
 
One former securities regulator, whose law firm participated in the Lex Mundi project by devoting 
hundreds of hours of junior lawyer time to completion of the questionnaire, expressed serious reservations 
to the author as to the meaningfulness of the data collected and its comparability across a large number of 
jurisdictions.  Very few law firm members of Lex Mundi, this participant noted, would have the capacity or 
resources to engage in such efforts, on an uncompensated and largely unacknowledged basis. 
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Digging at little deeper, the fundamental principles of corporate law may not be found in 
the “corporate law” at all, but rather in the Civil Code.82 It is even possible to have 
corporate law without clearly established notions of private property. 83 In the United 
States, large swathes of corporate law are now subsumed under “securities regulation” 84 
or left to the courts, the stock exchanges and corporations themselves.  Then there is the 
legal, political and commercial context in which corporate law, in its wider and narrower 
senses, operates; corporate law is permeated by “legal sensibilities” .    
 
These “interaction effects impede putting our finger on one or two key features as 
indicative of whether technical corporate law is overall good or bad”. 85 Nevertheless, 
the influential early LLSV literature attempted to isolate indicia of investor protection 86 
in formulating its analysis of shareholder and creditor rights in various jurisdictions.  In 
particular, certain “anti-director” indicia, representing  the presence of investor protection 
mechanisms, were isolated and an “index” formulated.  
 
The anti-director indicia chosen  as an indicator of the presence of meaningful 
shareholder rights, were: (i) one share/one vote or  multiple voting shares;  (ii) proxy 
 
80 See Roe, supra note 72,  at 28.   
81 See Roe & Bebchuck, supra note 74. 
82 The Dutch Civil Code (1992) is where you find Dutch corporate law, for a number of interesting 
historical reasons.   
83 Eg China, Vietnam 
84 See the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 107 P.L. 204 (2002)(“SOX”).  See also Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).   
85 See Roe, supra note 72 at 32. 
86 See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, supra note 33.  It should be noted here that certain of the 
LLSV authors, together with Simeon Djankov of The World Bank, have recently prepared a “revised” 
index; see  Djankov et al, infra note 147. 
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voting by mail; (iii) shares not blocked before shareholders’ meeting; (iv) cumulative 
voting for board of directors; (v) oppressed minorities mechanism; (vi) existing 
shareholders have preemptive rights for new equity issues; (vii) percentage of share 
capital (eg 5%  or 10%) to call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting.  LLSV indicates a 
“yes” for each of these indicia (except (iii)) for both the United States and Canada; each 
of the United States and Canada receives a 5 on the Anti Directors Rights Index (6 being 
high).  Both Canada and the United States, according to the index are highly investor 
protective, and in the same way. 
 
On their face, these indicia look familiar and straight-forward; they have been often 
repeated in the corporate governance literature in the intervening years. The indicia are 
taken, for the most part, from corporate statutes in the United States.  However, as 
indicators of shareholder rights and the level of protection which investors in publicly –
traded, listed corporations may expect, even in the United States, the indicia are more or 
less meaningless.  Roe in Corporate Law’s Limits (2002) tactfully pointed this out:  
“Wall Street lawyers might have reservations about heavily using preemptive rights, 
cumulative voting and the minimum percentage needed to call a special shareholders 
meeting – items not likely to be near the top of most American lawyers’ lists of Delaware 
corporate law’s most important legal protections …” 87. But then, these “anti-director” 
indicia have little to do with listed corporations in the United States, Delaware or 
otherwise. 
 
87 See Roe, supra note 72, at 29, fn 37. 
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Here are some examples of how complexity undermines the “anti-director indicia” of 
econometric theory.  The yes and no answers on the LLSV index are seriously 
misleading, even in the United States.  
 
Although most (but not all) of the anti-director indicia are drawn from corporate statutes, 
not all U.S. corporate statutes have the indicia.  There are fifty corporate statutes in the 
United States and great diversity of approach.  The “oppressed minorities mechanism”, 
for example, is not present in some state statutes (Florida, for example) and where it is 
present, may only be applicable in limited circumstances to shareholders in  privately or 
closely-held corporations, providing no protection whatsoever for investors in publicly 
traded corporations.    
 
It may be possible under all state statutes to create cumulative voting rights (a 
cumbersome, old-fashioned, procedural means of promoting, but not necessarily 
ensuring,  minority shareholder representation on the board of directors).  However, 
cumulative voting rights are rarely used (because they are not very effective), and 
certainly not for a listed U.S. corporation, if you can help it.88 
88Some Korean issuers have been saddled with cumulative voting. FINAL REPORT AND LEGAL 
REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea, 26 Iowa J. Corp. 
L. 546 (2001). The Final Report recommended making the practice of cumulative voting mandatory. That 
recommendation was not included in the Act. Korea established a voluntary cumulative voting system in 
1998, but few companies have adopted it. As of late May 2000, twenty-two percent of KSE listed 
companies (155 out of 707) have adopted it. See Ministry of Finance and Economy, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN FOR TRANSPARENT MANAGEMENT (Oct. 27, 2000), available at 
http://www.mofe.go.kr/cgi-pub/content.cgi?code=e fp&no=35 (last visited Nov. 5, 2001). See also Cho 
Young-sam, Activist Group Moving to Legislate Cumulative Voting, Class-Action Suits, Korea Herald, Oct. 
17, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27394157.  
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Equally, the creation  of preemptive rights (a means of avoiding dilution of  existing 
shareholder equity positions) may be possible under all U.S. corporate statutes but would 
never be found in a listed U.S. corporation as a matter of course (whereas they might in a 
British company).    
 
A statutory provision permitting a 10% shareholder to call an extraordinary meeting of 
shareholders, again, in the United States, would be irrelevant to most publicly listed 
corporations which are widely-held.89 
These are provisions which, where applicable, are more likely used in close or privately-
held corporations; in such circumstances there is usually an identity of management and 
ownership.  Shareholders more or less take care of themselves through negotiated means, 
the statute providing a set of default rules that are easily avoided. 
 
Corporate law, where it matters for public shareholders and investors, is mostly 
elsewhere, buried in layers of complexity.90 Corporate law statutes in the United States 
have been twisted and gutted by initiatives of the  Delaware legislature and the Delaware 
Court of Chancery  on the one hand, and federal “securities” regulation and the SEC, on 
the other.91 Contractual ordering (which breeds variation, specificity and, inevitably, 
complexity) dominates the corporate landscape:  stock exchange listing rules, corporate 
 
89 Even the largest institutional investors in U.S. corporations usually hold no more than 2-3 % of the 
outstanding shares of any one issuer.  For example, as of December 31, 2005, the fifteen largest 
institutional investors in Microsoft each held between 0.6% and 4.1% of the outstanding shares.  See 
http://moneycentral.msn.com/investor/invsub/ownership/ownership.asp?Symbol=msft (3/22/2006). 
90 There has been much written about the great complexity of Sarbanes-Oxley.  See, e.g., The trial of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, THE ECONOMIST, April 22, 2006, at 59.  
91 See Roe, supra note 84; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 84.  
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charters, customized share provisions, tailor-made by-laws .92 The inadequacy of the 
“anti-director indicia” to capture the complex dynamic of public shareholder rights in the 
United States should be obvious at this point.  Applying these indicia across jurisdictions 
to produce meaningful results is even more problematic.  The premise is wrong 93 and the 
criteria for comparison irrelevant.   
 
B. Hidden Assumptions 
 
One of the objectives of comparative legal scholarship is to “unearth, by comparative 
study, the hidden assumptions of different legal systems…, particularly those legal 
assumptions that are so obvious that they are never discussed, or even noticed”.94 
Uncovering and testing some of the assumptions underlying the bonding hypothesis may 
cast the hypothesis in a different light.   
 
1. U.S. Investor Protection and Shareholder Rights are the Best 
Key to the bonding hypothesis as explanatory of foreign cross-listing is the high level of 
investor protection in the United States.  Effective, enforceable shareholder rights are 
usually viewed as a prime component of investor protection.  The early LLSV literature, 
with its indicia of shareholder rights and “anti-director” index, has been frequently 
invoked in investigations related to the bonding hypothesis (and other aspects of financial 
 
92 A simple by-law amendment put into effect by a short written consent of the majority shareholder was 
sufficient to disable the board of directors and set the cat among the pigeons in the Hollinger International  
disputes in 2004.  Although completely in conformity with Delaware statutory law, the by-law amendment 
was subsequently overturned by Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine, exercising his equitable jurisdiction. See 
Hollinger International Inc. v. Conrad M. Black, et al. C.A. No. 183-N (Feb 26 2004). 
93 “Anti-director” based on agency theory, i.e. the management/shareholder conflict which may not be the 
actual dynamic operating; cf Hollinger, supra note 92 .
94 See Mattei, supra note 73. 
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market development).95 The United States (and Canada, for that matter) scored high.96 
These particular indicia of shareholder rights have become self-propagating, spreading, 
along with class actions and derivative rights of action, as effective corporate governance 
mechanisms, to the furthest reaches of corporate law around the world.97 
The assumption appears to be that U.S. mechanisms for investor protection and 
shareholders rights are, if not the best, then, at the least, the benchmark against which all 
others should be measured.  How else to account for such a vibrant financial market as 
exists in the United States?  But, is this one of those pernicious “hidden assumptions”, so 
obvious that it is “never discussed, or even noticed”? 98 This assumption bears some 
scrutiny as does its implications for the mechanisms of investor protections and 
shareholder rights in domestic legal systems outside the United States.  
 
Many non-U.S. legal systems have been referred to as “weak legal systems”99 if they do 
not score high on the LLSV “anti-director” index.  This is the classic blunder of the 
amateur comparativist, confounding difference with deficiency.  If an indicia, in this case, 
of shareholders’ rights, is “missing” from a legal system, it must be a sign of a 
deficiency, contributing to a lower level of economic development, and an  oversight to 
be remedied100. This is simply not the case. 
 
95 See e.g. Coffee, supra note 2; King & Segal, supra note 21. 
96 See Rafael La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, supra note 33. See table 2. 
97 Recently proposed or enacted corporate legislation in places as different as Bahrain and China now 
contain or propose such provisions, likely to no great effect on corporate governance. 
98Arguably not, since there is such a large body of legal analysis produced on an annual basis providing a 
blow by blow critique.    
99 See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33. 
100 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, et al., supra note 78. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The 
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. Rev. 641, 
643-48 (1999). 
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As Roe remarks, “[n]ot only do corporate players in France, Germany, Scandinavia think 
their corporate law is fine, but they sometimes proclaim its superiority in some 
dimensions over the American variety” 101 Insofar as formal shareholders’ rights are 
concerned, this is a claim to take seriously.    Corporate law statutes in the United States 
provide shareholders, in particular shareholders of publicly-traded corporations, with 
paltry and basically illusory rights compared to most European statutes, 102 particularly 
since the legislative reaction to the 1985 Delaware decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom103.
Noted for the already strong managerial bias in its corporate statute, Delaware acted 
shortly after the Van Gorkom decision to permit its corporations, by charter amendment, 
to alleviate the duty of care owed by managers to shareholders.     In this, and other pro-
managerial, initiatives104, other state statutes followed suit, with two differences.  In some 
cases, the state statutes went even further than Delaware in favor of loosening the 
remnants of shareholder fetters over management.  Secondly, few states possessed a 
judiciary with the authority in corporate law matters of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
 
101 See Roe, supra note 72 at 28.  
102 A cursory perusal of the U.S. proxy materials for a European corporation, such as Nokia, for example, 
indicates the much wider array of matters on which shareholders in a European corporation may have direct 
oversight. 
103 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
104 The fact that Delaware corporate law is receptive to corporate management concerns and needs, often at 
the expense of shareholders, is well known. This intentional courting of business interests through 
legislative drafting and judicial decision making in Delaware has made it a haven for business and, 
consequently, rich in law concerning corporate activities. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and 
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the 
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. 
REV. 913 (1982); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 861 (1969); James F. Ritter, Comment, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 72 VA. L. REV. 851 (1986).  
Janet E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shopping for a “new" interpretation of the Revlon standard: the effect of the 
QVC decision on strategic mergers, 58 ALB. L. REV. 609, 676 (1995). 
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ready at a moment’s notice to redress potential imbalances between shareholders and 
management.  Not that the Delaware Court of Chancery necessarily rushes to do so. 105 
Arguably, the fiduciary duty of managers (and possibly majority shareholders) is the 
greatest source of protection from expropriation to which U.S. shareholders can look.  
The fiduciary duty is not, strictly speaking, a shareholder right; it is a much more diffuse 
concept (despite attempts at various statutory formulations).  As an equitable principle, 
based on notions of fairness, it is not amenable to bright line tests or econometric 
analysis.  It is a creation of the courts of equity and dependent on   these same courts for 
its vitality.  Unhappily for shareholders of U.S. corporations, procedural and other bright 
line tests, now found in statutory law and guidance such as the ALI Principles of 
Corporate Governance, have provided U.S. courts (even Delaware courts, at times) a 
means to avoid hard questions associated with the exercise of their equitable 
discretion.106 sapping the fiduciary duty of its normative vigor. 
 
All this to say, that things are even worse than they might at first appear for shareholders 
in U.S. corporations.  Enactment of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (technically, 
not “corporate” legislation) is a symptom of, not necessarily the solution to, the plight of 
the U.S. shareholder.  In Delaware’s Competition, Roe ponders whether the Enron and 
 
105 See Nixon v. Blackwell,  626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993):   “The tools of good corporate practice are 
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting 
with consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an 
ad hoc ruling which would result in a court- imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not 
contracted.”  See also Roe, supra note 84.  
106 See 1 AMERICAN L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).   
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WorldCom debacles, which prompted Sarbanes-Oxley, might have been avoided, had 
U.S. corporate statutes taken a different turn in 1986. 107 
The Enron/WorldCom debacle has shaken somewhat the assumption of the superiority of 
U.S. investor protection and shareholder rights.  The early LLSV literature, however, was 
written in the heady pre-debacle days and appears to have internalized the assumption of 
a high level of formal investor protection through the operation of shareholder rights 
found in state corporate statutes.  As noted above, the “anti-director indicia” of the LLSV 
studies are not, in fact, a measure of vibrant shareholder rights, and never have been.     
 
In the United States, shareholders’ rights and investor protection have been decoupled.  
Investor protections continue to operate outside the sphere of corporate law per se, in the 
virtual absence of shareholders rights.   At this point, it is unclear whether the non-
corporate law mechanisms of investor protection (stock exchange listing rules, industry 
associations, securities regulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission) will be, 
or have been, able to fully compensate for the demise of basic principles associated with 
shareholders rights.  Some of these non-corporate law mechanisms are, inevitably, 
skewed in favor of the interests of market intermediaries.  And, the Byzantine maze of    
complex technicalities that we know as securities regulation has its own limitations.108 
It gets worse.  The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley is also indicative of the erosion of certain 
“legal sensibilities” that have complemented formal shareholders rights and investor 
 
107 See Roe, supra note 84.  
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protection. Is the corporate “Code of ethics” required by Sarbanes-Oxley a substitute for 
commonly held tenets of fair dealing as a moral conviction which goes beyond the 
diluted commercial standards now prevalent?109 Are these legal sensibilities another 
hidden assumption which may no longer be operative? 
 
2.  U.S. Investor Protection and Minority Shareholder rights are better in 
the United States than in Canada 
 
Assumption number two, that U.S. investor protection and minority shareholder rights are 
better in the United States than in Canada, must hold true for the bonding hypothesis to 
be applicable to CBIs.   If assumption number one, the superiority of U.S. investor 
protections and shareholders rights, holds true, then assumption number two is axiomatic.   
But assumption number one is seriously flawed.   
 
The “anti-director indicia” of the early LLSV studies110 had Canada and the United States 
in a dead heat with an index rating of 5 out of 6.  Responses to presence of indicia were 
identical, with the exception of percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting being lower (5%) in Canada than in the United States (10%). This 
 
108 In the aftermath of the disappearance of the accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, the debate over the 
desirability of principles based accounting,  rather than technical, rules based accounting, intensified. 
109 The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance, Part V, supra note 106, proposed a 
commercial fair dealing standard. The NYSE also proposed rules requiring all listed companies to adopt a 
code of business conduct that addresses issues including fair dealing.  See Corporate Accountability and 
Listing Standards Committee of NYSE, AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE NYSE’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
RULE PROPOSALS, at 20, available at www.nyse.com/pdfs/amend1-04-09-03.pdf (last visited on Sept. 5, 
2004.)  See also Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-
Interest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954, 961 
(1993). 
110 See Rafael La Porta, et al., supra note 33; King & Segal, supra note 21. 
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would have indicated a marginally more shareholder-friendly environment in Canada.  
On their face, these results would not be surprising, there being a good degree of 
comparability in the corporate legislation in the two countries.  The conclusion drawn 
from the table would be that the level of shareholder rights, and concomitantly, investor 
protection, in the two countries is similar.   
 
As a very general proposition, this may be correct.   If so, it would not lend strong 
support to the bonding hypothesis as explanatory of CBIs’ cross-listing behavior.  
Digging a little deeper though, differences begin to emerge.  As in the United States, 
cumulative voting and preemptive rights in Canada are fairly meaningless as a form of 
investor protection.  However, given the more concentrated ownership structure of 
Canadian corporations, rights accorded to 5% shareholders (to call an extraordinary 
general meeting, for example) are very real.  Not only is the absolute threshold lower (5% 
as opposed to 10%), it is not uncommon for an institutional shareholder in a publicly-
traded corporation in Canada, alone or together with others, to meet the threshold.   
 
Secondly, again unlike the United States, statutory oppressed minorities mechanisms are 
also very real in Canada.  There are several reasons for this.  Much of Canadian corporate 
legislation looks to both the United States and the United Kingdom as primary sources. 
The outlines of the U.S. Model Business Corporations Act [1968] (MBCA) are readily 
discernible in the Canada Business Corporations Act. 111 However, the Canadian 
legislation is based on the earlier MBCA, not the current Revised Model Business 
Corporations Act (1984) (RMBCA), The earlier MBCA is notably more shareholder 
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protective than the current version 112 In addition, the Canadian statutes have not seen 
shareholders’ rights, the ones that count, such as the fiduciary duty of managers, 
compromised as severely as they have been in the United States in the aftermath of Smith 
v. van Gorkom.   
 
Most importantly, the oppression remedy113 in the Canadian statutes derives from U.K., 
not U.S., law.  It traces its origins back to the “great mother” of Commonwealth 
companies laws, the Companies Act of 1948 (U.K.)114. Unlike in the United States, this 
shareholder remedy is an extremely broad and flexible one applicable to all corporations, 
not just closely-held ones or in limited circumstances.  It is thus a powerful weapon in the 
arsenal of investor protection.   
 
In fact, of all the Commonwealth variations of the statutory oppression remedy deriving 
from the original one in the 1948  U.K. Act, the Canadian version is the broadest and 
most shareholder-friendly. There are no procedural hurdles (such as exist in the 
derivative action) and the action permits any aggrieved minority shareholder (as well as 
other corporate actors, even creditors) their day in court.  In the face of the statutory 
oppression remedy of the U.K. variety, the U.S.-style statutory derivative action (also 
present in Canadian law), has withered away.115 
111 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S., c. C-44 (1985) . 
112 Henry F. Johnson & Paul Bartlett, Jr., Is a Fistful of Dollars the Answer? A Critical Look at Dissenters’ 
Rights Under The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 12 J.L. & COM. 211 (1993); Douglas M. 
Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act: Death Knells for Main Street 
Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 284 (1993); Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the 
Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97-98 (1989).
113 Sometimes referred to as the unfairly prejudicial remedy. 
114 Companies Act, 1948 (U.K.),1948, c. 38. 
115 Brian R Cheffins, Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects,
COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV., 1: 227-60 (1997). 
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The oppression remedy is a broad, equitable one though and it is dependent on a judiciary 
which shows no reticence in exercising its equitable jurisdiction.  Like their U.K. 
counterparts, with which they continue to share many legal sensibilities, the Canadian 
courts have not hesitated to provide equitable relief in corporate law matters. 116 Given 
the concentrated ownership structures of Canadian corporations (and the possibilities for 
minority shareholder expropriation so presented), the courts have been highly solicitous 
of minority shareholder rights. 117 
Although not apparent on their face, certain of the “anti-director indicia” of the LLSV 
literature, are, in fact, correlated to higher levels of investor protection in Canada, 
although not in the United States.  Shareholders rights under Canadian corporate law 
continue to support other investor protection mechanisms; they have not become 
“decoupled” to the extent they have in the United States.  As for the formal investor 
protections found in listing rules and securities regulation, on their face, they are very 
similar in Canada and the United States thanks in part to the harmonizing forces of the 
MJDS.   
 
King and Segal however, look beyond the LLSV “anti-director indicia” and convergence 
of  the formal regulatory regimes, to question the level of investor protection in Canada 
 
116 See e.g., Ford Motor Co. of Canada, Ltd. v. Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board, O.J. No. 
191 (2004).  Generally speaking, Canadian courts have “given the oppression remedy a very liberal 
interpretation, both with respect to standing and the types of remedies that can be awarded.”  Jeffrey S. 
Leon & Sarah J. Armstrong, The Relevance of the Oppression Remedy as a Control on Corporate 
Governance in Canada (2003); see Fasken Martineau website:  
http://www.fasken.com/WEB/fmdwebsite.nsf/AllDoc/CB3263AD655EA90D85256D500067E7C6/$File/C
ORPORATEGOVERNANCE.PDF!OpenElement. 
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118 They look to two indicators, the incidence of insider trading in Canada and the  
number of  investigations by the U.S. SEC of the activities of Canadian MJDS issuers.  
Neither of these indicators however is conclusive of a lower level of investor protection 
or shareholders’ rights in Canada.  
 
There is no denying the existence of insider trading in Canada.119 In the past, the 
fragmented nature of provincial securities regulation in Canada may also have made 
prosecution of insider trading offences more problematic than in the United States.120 
But is insider trading more egregious or more prevalent in Canada than in the United 
States?  Unclear.  One industry participant (who was not convinced that insider trading in 
Canada posed greater risks to investors than in the United States) noted that abuses  
appeared concentrated in one particular natural resource industry, perhaps as many as  
90% of them.121 And, insider trading, of course, is only one form of potential investor 
abuse, albeit one which captures the public imagination with its resonances to Greek 
tragedy and the gratifying spectacle of the mighty laid low. 
 
117 Id. 
118 See King & Segal, supra note 21. 
119 See King & Segal, supra note 21 at 9.  
120 See Cally Jordan, Lessons from the Bennett Affair, 38 MCGILL L.J. 1071 (1993). The Bennett Affair was 
a high profile insider trading case involving a former premier of the Province of British Columbia and his 
brother and the sale of certain shares over the Toronto Stock Exchange.  Proceedings, judicial and 
administrative, dragged on for several years in both Ontario (the place of execution of the trades)  and 
British Columbia (the place of residence of the initiators of the trades and where the trades were actually 
initiated), each under different legislation and regulators.  Jurisdictional difficulties hampered cooperation 
among the various provincial regulators within Canada.  Two large institutional investors reached a 
settlement early on, leaving small retail investors the losers.  Ironically, at the time, several provincial 
regulators had entered into international  Memoranda of Understanding regarding cooperation and 
information sharing with regulators outside Canada, meaning that there could have been greater 
cooperation internationally among regulators than there was domestically within Canada.  Calls for a 
national securities regulator in Canada have gone unheeded for decades.   See Cally Jordan, Comment on 
‘An Alternative Regulatory Model for Canada’:  A View from Afar, Queen’s University Annual Business 
Law Symposium 2001, at 59 (Scarborough: Carswell, 2002). 
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The statistics quoted in the King and Segal paper on  investigations by the SEC of  
wrongdoing by MJDS issuers are also not strongly persuasive.122 Given the large number 
of Canadian issuers in the U.S. market, the number of investigations does not seem 
egregious and on a pro rata basis is no greater than for other FPIs.  According to a senior 
Toronto practitioner, “[i]n today’s environment it is difficult to imagine that the Canadian 
market is less efficiently regulated than the United States market given that most of the 
really egregious behaviour of late has taken place in the United States.  Mr. King’s theory 
may have had more legs some years ago but not now I think”.123 
A more controversial proposition may be whether Canadian minority 
shareholder/investor protection is better than that in the United States.  As noted above in 
the context of the comparison of minority oppression mechanisms, shareholder 
protections are decidedly more robust in Canadian corporate statutes. The Canadian 
statutory oppression remedy is a powerful deterrent to managerial malfeasance, as well as 
a real and flexible tool for shareholder action.  It is but one example of the way in which 
Canadian corporate law has remained more heavily weighted in favor of shareholder 
protection; there are other examples.124 
121 Perhaps as an indication of how sensitive the issue may be in Canada, the industry participant making 
this comment to the author in  the course of an interview in the spring of 2004, asked that this observation 
not be attributed personally to him. 
122 “Of the 13 cases of legal actions brought by the SEC against foreign firms between 1995 and 2002, 4 
were brought against Canadian firms.” See King & Segal, supra note 21 at 9. 
123 E-mail from Andrew Fleming, Senior Partner, Ogilvy Renault to Cally Jordan, Associate Professor 
Levin College of Law (February 26, 2004, 17:14 EST) (on file with author).   
124 Audit committees have been a statutory requirement of CBCA publicly traded companies since 1975.  
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There has also not been the decoupling of corporate shareholder rights and securities law 
investor protections that has occurred in the United States.  In Canada, there has been an 
ongoing interaction and overlap between corporate statutes and securities regulation.125 
Jurisdictional competition there may be at certain levels, but the capital markets are 
centered in Toronto, Ontario, a longstanding fact, made even more obvious by the recent 
consolidation of all Canadian equity trading in the Toronto Stock Exchange (with one 
minor exception). 126 The capital markets are subject to the oversight of a provincial 
Ontario regulator and provincial securities regulation.  Ontario has its own corporate 
statute127 and the Ontario government can coordinate legislative initiatives in both 
corporate and securities laws.  It is as though the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC 
both operated out of Delaware. 
 
The regulatory environment has also been responsive to the concentrated ownership 
structure characteristic of the Canadian corporate world.  The correlation between 
concentration of ownership and weak investor protection noted in the early LLSV 
literature does not hold true in Canada.  The takeover bid regime offers better protections 
for public investors than in the United States.  Many mergers and corporate 
reorganizations require majority of the minority shareholder approvals.  Where there are 
dual class shares (often the case in concentrated ownership structures), mandatory 
 
125 As elsewhere, securities regulation has adapted more quickly to changing circumstances. 
126 In 2001, the Toronto Stock Exchange consolidated as Canada’s major equity trading market. 
127 Canada has both federal and provincial corporate statutes, many but not all, showing a high degree of 
harmonization and affinities to the MBCA.  There is no federal or national securities regulator, only 
provincial regulators, with some, like the Ontario Securities Commission which directly oversees the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, obviously being more important than others. 
42
coattails or tag-along rights are usual.128 In fact, these Canadian regulatory techniques 
have been emulated elsewhere as a means of improving corporate governance, increasing 
investor protection and promoting investor confidence in capital markets. 129 
In addition, securities law enforcement has demonstrated a different approach, 
proceeding as it did from a different regulatory tradition.  Despite the very sharp 
convergence over the last decade and a half to a U.S.- style  regulatory framework and 
associated institutions,  securities regulators in Canada continue to pursue policies of 
intervention before or instead of prosecutorial or judicial action. Regulation of the 
financial sector generally has been impressed with the benign British influences of 
regulation by persuasion, the apocryphal “tea with the Governor of the Bank of England” 
approach to financial sector regulation.130 Regulatory intervention is “prompt” and 
“focused”.131 
128 A coattail provision comes into play when there are 2 classes of shares:  a voting class and a non-voting 
class.  Basically a  coattail provision provides that if an offer is made for all or substantially all of the 
voting shares and that offer is accepted, then the class of shares which do not have voting rights are granted 
voting rights unless they receive the same offer.  A tag-along allows a minority shareholder the right to 
participate in a transaction at the same pro rata price of other owners where a threshold interest is being 
transferred.  This allows a minority shareholder the opportunity to monetize her interests along with the 
majority owners.  Where a dual class structure exists, the Toronto Stock Exchange listing rules specifically 
require coattails to be given to the subordinate shares, as well as notice of meetings, rights of participation 
in meetings,  a right to receive information on an equal basis, and in the discretion of the Exchange, voting 
rights in certain circumstances.  See TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, SEC. 624 
(RESTRICTED SECURITIES); OSC RULE 56-501 (RESTRICTED SHARES) (Oct. 25, 1999), available at  
www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rules/56-501. 
129 For example, the BOVESPA, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, in creating its “Novo Mercado” or 
“corporate governance board”, a listing segment requiring issuers to implement voluntarily certain 
corporate governance mechanisms in order to list, includes Canadian-inspired tag-along rights for minority 
shareholders.  See Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 73. 
130 This approach is now becoming a thing of the past, especially in the United Kingdom, with the advent of 
more formal regulatory approaches and the change in the role of the Bank of England. However, it has been 
remarkably effective in its time.  Emulated in Commonwealth Canada, it produced a remarkably stable 
banking system over the last century.  Bank failures, of any kind, were virtually unheard of. 
131 See Fleming, supra note 123. 
43
Then there is the big fish in a small pond effect.  As in other small countries, such as the 
Netherlands or Scandinavia, which are also home to large international corporations,  the 
reputational stakes are arguably higher in Canada.  Nortel sinks and virtually every small 
investor in Canada gasps.  There is nowhere in Canada for CBIs to hide, from regulators, 
analysts or the public investor; legal sensibilities at work. 
 
The above discussion is not intended as a panegyric to Canadian corporate and securities 
regulation; like any other system, there are flaws, weaknesses, failures.  And much to 
learn from the United States experience.  However, the point is to belie certain of the 
hidden and not-so-hidden assumptions underlying the bonding hypothesis, as applicable 
to CBIs.  
 
Which leaves us with the question.  What did account for the sudden interest in cross-
listing by CBIs, and the particular way in which they do it? 
 
VI. Home Bias and the Chameleon  Effect 
 
It is likely that the more traditional reasons for cross-listing, rather than the bonding 
hypothesis, provide the motivation for the recent activities of CBIs. 132 In particular, the 
integration of product and capital markets is likely a significant factor in CBI cross-
listing.  And, different sectors appear to have different motivations.  Canada has a high 
 
132 See Usha R. Mittoo, Globalization and the Value of U.S. Listing: Revisiting Canadian Evidence,” 27:9 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1629 (2003).  
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technology industry (think BlackBerry) and a NASDAQ listing provides comparability, 
as well as potential increased product visibility. 
 
Rather than why CBIs are cross-listing, what may be of greater interest is how CBIs are 
cross-listing.  The bonding hypothesis may have been seductive when looking at Latin 
American issuers, for example, 133 but CBIs appear to be adroitly making use of the  
“home bias” phenomenon  instead.   
 
A number of recent studies have observed the “home bias” effect.  Stated simply, home 
bias means that U.S. investors tend to overweight domestic stocks in their common stock 
portfolio.134 CBIs are not using a cross-listing to “bond”, i.e. to signal to the U.S. market 
that they are voluntarily adhering to higher standards of corporate governance and 
submitting themselves to more rigorous regulatory scrutiny and oversight in the United 
States.   Rather, CBIs are studiously avoiding any signaling effect whatsoever, 135 
blending into the U.S. corporate woodwork.  By passing themselves off as domestic U.S. 
issuers, CBIs take advantage of the home bias effect to sneak into U.S. domestic 
portfolios.  This is a venerable tradition for CBIs, dating back to Nortel’s New York 
Stock Exchange listing in 1975. 136 This is the “chameleon effect”. 
 
133 See Coffee, supra note 2 at 19-23. 
134 See Magnus Dahlquist, et al, Corporate Governance and the Home Bias, 38 JFQA 87 (2003); Tesar &  
Werner, supra note 10. 
135 As noted elsewhere, the very public patent woes of RIM may mark a reconsideration of this approach 
for Canadian issuers; it may become desirable to signal “Canadianess” if such is associated with 
innovative, essential gadgets.  
136 Nortel changed its name around the time of first listing, used domestic U.S. filing forms (which at the 
time it was obliged to use) and deliberately chose a “U.S.” look for its information documents.  Nortel 
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VII.  Implications of the Chameleon Effect 
 
The immediate implication of the chameleon effect is good news for U.S. investors.   
They are getting the best of both worlds, albeit perhaps unwittingly.  They are buying 
what looks like U.S. domestic stock, which may be subject to the usual domestic judicial 
recourses, and in some cases, the oversight and protections of U.S. securities regulation 
and exchange rules. They are also getting the benefit of the oversight and penchant for 
early intervention of the Canadian securities regulatory regime.   But even better, U.S. 
investors become Canadian shareholders, enjoying statutory and other rights and 
protections likely beyond their wildest imaginings. 137 
Over time, continued integration and deeper penetration of the U.S. market by a certain 
segment of Canadian issuers appears inevitable.  As trading volume grows in the United 
States, some CBIs  may lose their “foreign private issuer” status 138 and the current 
flexibility which they enjoy in terms of how they enter the market.  Status as an FPI, for 
example, is a condition of use of the MJDS.  Again over time, investors in the United 
States may lose some of the benefits of greater shareholder protections under Canadian 
law, as the chameleon effect is replaced by the Delaware/Canadian corporation.  
Hollinger International Inc. may have been a precursor:  a Delaware incorporated, New 
 
listed in November 1975 and changed its name from Northern Electric to Northern Telecom in early 1976. 
In 1995, it became NORTEL. Source:  NYSE and NORTEL web sites. 
137 Recent large settlements in Canada by Nortel may be bringing this fact to the attention of US investors.  
Again, Nortel’s recent financial difficulties may have resulted in US investors paying greater attention to 
the potential presented by Canadian remedies;  in a recent representative action against Nortel in the United 
States, plaintiffs lost but have refiled in Ontario (motion not yet heard).  See Loc 302 and 612 International 
Union of Operating Engineers v. Nortel Civil Action No. 04-CV-05954 (AP) (Judge Preska, SDNY).   
138 One of the tests of FPI status is trading volume. 
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York listed corporation, majority-controlled by a Canadian incorporated, Canadian (and 
not U.S.) listed parent.139 
In future, there may also be greater self-restraint on the part of Canadian issuers in 
making the decision to cross-list. Already, there is speculation that the surge in cross-
listing activity in the 1990s was fuelled, in part, by the distortions of the tech bubble 141 
As well, some sectors do not appear to benefit as much as others from cross-listing142 
giving support to the importance of product recognition and trade flows as determining 
factors in the cross-listing decision. 143 Real estate companies and the grocery business 
tend to stay home, tethered to local customers.   And, finally, there is no doubt that the 
regulatory and financial burdens imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley give Canadian issuers 
pause, as they do their European counterparts. 144 
More interestingly perhaps, are the implications of the chameleon effect that go beyond 
CBIs.  Where Canadian issuers have gone, will others follow?  Is the Canadian 
experience the precursor?  Going forward, will other FPIs emulate CBIs, or will CBIs 
remain a category apart. Israeli issuers, for example, also make use of the chameleon 
 
139 In the recent Delaware reincorporation of Australian News Corp. in November 2004, a controversial 
issue among Australian shareholders, was the loss of  the benefit of the more shareholder protective 
Australian corporate law regime. See THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD at http://www.smh.com.au/. 
140 G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings and Cross-Listings of the World: Challenging 
Conventional Wisdom, Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University (October 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.cob.ohio-
state.edu/fin/faculty/karolyi/papers/The%20World%20of%20Cross%20Listings%20Survey.pdf. 
141 See Coffee, supra 2 at 54. 
142 See King & Segal, supra note 21. 
143 See Coffee, supra note 2. 
144 See infra note 150. 
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effect.145 NAFTA, geographic proximity and cultural affinities are not explanatory in the 
case of Israeli issuers, yet there is a similar phenomenon.146 
Will more FPIs (the Chinese, for example)  consider direct cross-listings of equity 
securities (as they do in Hong Kong),  without the additional expense and complexity of 
creating ADR programs.  The traditional benefits of ADR programs (currency 
conversion, clearing and settlement services, information dissemination) are significantly 
less compelling in the wired (or more aptly, wireless) world of today.  Mainland Chinese 
issuers listing in Hong Kong, for example, do not use a derivative form of security 
comparable to ADRs.   Will interest in the use of  ADRs fade, in favor of direct listing?   
 
As argued above, the bonding hypothesis has never been strongly persuasive as a 
motivation behind cross-listing of CBIs.  Of late, its explanatory force as a motivation for 
other FPIs has also diminished with the events of recent years.  The Enron/Worldcom 
scandals seriously exposed the “hidden assumption” of the innate superiority of U.S. 
investor protections. 147 The early LLSV literature, based upon this assumption, is being 
 
145 See, Amir Licht, Managerial Opportunism and Foreign Listing:  Some Direct Evidence 22(2)  U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 325 (2000). 
146 Coffee, supra note 2 at 23-25. 
147 See DJANKOV, LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, & SHLEIFER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF SELF-
DEALING (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11883, 2005), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11883. In the (Revised) Anti-director rights index (Table XII) the United 
States scores a 3 out of 6 as opposed to the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which 
score 4 or 5 out of 6.  As noted above, the anti-director indicia, as an indicator of shareholder protection in 
publicly traded companies are more or less meaningless. However, in this study at least, the authors have 
chosen a methodology likely to produce more meaningful results; the field of inquiry is narrower and the 
manner of soliciting information more open-ended (a fact pattern designed to elicit more accurate responses 
based on the particular analysis which the facts would evoke in each jurisdiction.) 
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critically revisited. 148 The Wall Street Journal has looked at how U.K. law gives 
shareholders greater direct oversight of managerial action, for example, with respect to 
executive compensation.149 
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, the attempt to shore up U.S. corporate governance 
standards, is itself highly controversial both at home and abroad.  Roberta Romano refers 
to it dismissively as “quack corporate governance”. The great irony, for the bonding 
hypothesis, is that there has been no rush by FPIs to signal adherence to these “improved” 
corporate governance standards in the United States by flocking to U.S. markets.  Rather, 
delisting from U.S. exchanges is the new phenomenon, much to the consternation of New 
York Stock Exchange officials.150 Canadian issuers though are unlikely to follow the 
rest of the FPI pack in the rush to the exits. 151 CBIs are now a permanent, and largely 
indistinguishable, feature of the U.S. corporate landscape.  The question here, from the 
 
148 Id.  “Several authors have criticized [the director rights index] for both its ad hoc nature (which the 
creation of our anti-self dealing index is supposed to address) and for several conceptual ambiguities and 
outright mistakes in coding.” at 4. 
149 ’No Excessive Pay, We’re British – U.K. Reins In CEO Compensation as Shareholders Hold More 
Sway; Is It a U.S. Model, or Overrated?, WALL ST. J.,  February 8, 2006 at C1, col. 1. 
150 “Companies that choose to list on the NYSE ‘meet the highest standards of any market anywhere’, says 
Noreen Culhane, executive vice president in charge of listings at the Big Board.  She argues that it lets 
them sell their stock for a higher price, and therefore puts a higher value on their company.  Companies 
tend to list in the market where they believe they [sic] shares will get the best price.  In years when the U.S. 
market is rallying, New York tends to attract more foreign issuers, she says, because companies feel they 
get a better price for their shares when U.S. markets are hot”. Craig Karmin & Aaron Lucchetti, New York 
Loses Edge in Snagging Foreign Listings, WALL ST. J., January 26, 2006, at C1. 
151 See also SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Comments at the 4th Annual Financial Services 
Conference, available at SEC Website: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch013106psa.htm.  “Our 
mission to facilitate capital formation extends not just to companies headquartered in the United States, but 
to those from outside the country as well. I was therefore troubled to read … in The Wall Street Journal an 
article about a Bombay-listed company, Indiabulls Financial Services, which decided to list its shares on an 
overseas stock market but elected not to register in the United States. Their decision reportedly turned on 
the excessive time and cost required for a registration in the U.S. compared with listing in jurisdictions in 
Europe. They made this decision despite the fact that many of the company's largest investors are U.S. 
money managers.  If this story actually reflects a rising trend, it is not a welcome one from my 
perspective.”  
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point of view of U.S. regulators, is whether the large Canadian presence justifies 
continued “special status” for CBIs, or on the other hand, militates in favor of “domestic” 
treatment (especially if they are seen as masquerading,  for purposes of taking advantage 
of the home bias effect,  as U.S. issuers). 
 
For all FPIs, however, the recent questioning of the “hidden assumption” of the 
superiority of U.S. governance mechanisms should lend credence to greater regulatory 
deference in the United States to “home country” corporate governance.152 The NYSE, 
and to a certain, more limited extent, the SEC, have both implicitly acknowledged 
“different but equivalent” non –U.S. corporate governance mechanisms.153 On this 
basis, the SEC has given non-U.S. issuers accommodations with respect to compliance 
with certain aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements.154 In the glare of considerable 
 
152 Former SEC General Counsel, Ed Greene, and his colleagues at Cleary Gottlieb, have argued for 
greater deference on the part of the SEC for over a decade; see  Ed Greene, et al Hegemony or 
Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in International Capital Markets 50 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 413 
(1995). 
153 “On the occasion of the visit of EU Internal Markets Commissioner Charlie McCreevy to Washington 
DC, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and Commissioner McCreevy took stock of progress on and affirmed 
their commitment to eliminating the need for reconciliation between International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  Chairman Cox believes the 
use of IFRS has the potential to produce significant benefits for US investors through enhanced 
comparability of financial information about investment choices around the world.  He congratulates 
Commissioner McCreevy on the strides made by the European Union toward implementing IFRS, and 
further notes the work accomplished by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the 
independent body charged with establishing high-quality-global accounting standards.  Chairman Cox 
reaffirms his commitment to the ‘roadmap’ to eliminate, by 2009 at the latest, the SEC requirement for 
foreign private issuers to reconcile IFRS-based financial statements to US GAAP.”  Press Release, SEC,  
Accounting Standards: SEC Chairman Cox and EU Commissioner McCreevy Affirm Commitment to 
Elimination of the Need for Reconciliation Requirements (Feb. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-17.htm. The US SEC reconciliation requirement to US GAAP has 
been a long-standing irritant for non-US issuers entering the US market as it necessitates additional costs 
and administrative efforts in an already costly exercise.  The NYSE has also provided  “waivers” of certain 
corporate governance requirements for non –U.S. issuers for a number of years.  See supra note 14.  
154 Audit committees and independence of members, for example.  The audit committee requirements of 
Sarbanes-Oxley have been some of its most criticized provisions.  In response to this, although the 
legislation itself makes no distinction between domestic and foreign issuers, the U.S. SEC has issued rules 
that create “[t]ailored exemptions and guidance where the requirements of Exchange Act Section 10A(m) 
could result in a direct conflict with home country requirements”.  See Standards Relating to Listed 
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publicity, the SEC also acted very speedily to provide relief for FPIs wishing to delist in 
the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. 155 
The bonding hypothesis is not explanatory of the largest and most important segment of 
cross-listed foreign issuers in the United States, Canadian issuers.  Even more 
significantly, perhaps, looking below the surface of the bonding hypothesis reveals the 
hidden assumptions about the nature of shareholder rights and investor protection in the 
United States.    These assumptions are worth questioning. 
 
Company Audit Committees, 17. C.F.R. 240 (2003), available at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8220.htm#>P392-120623. 
155 See SEC set to ease rules for foreign groups, FINANCIAL TIMES, December 5, 2005, at 1, col. 2:  “Alan  
Beller, director of the SEC corporation finance division, told the Financial Times that the commission was 
considering the reform because “we do not believe companies should feel trapped in our markets.”” 
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Appendix 1. Canadian Corporations Listed on the New York Stock Exchange (2004) 
Canadian Companies Listed On 
NYSE 
Original 
Date of 
Listing Industry Issue Type IPO ADRs 
Inco Ltd. (N)
12/20/1928 Non-ferrous Metals 
Common 
Stock  
Alcan Inc. (AL)
5/31/1950 Aluminum  
Common 
Stock   
Nortel Network Corp. (NT)
11/10/1975
Communications 
Technology  
Common 
Stock   
BCE Incorparation (BCE)
8/18/1976 
Fixed-line 
Communications  
Common 
Stock   
Moore Wallace Incorporated (MWI)
11/13/1980
Furnishings & 
Appliances  
Common 
Stock   
Zarlink Semiconductor, Inc. (ZL)
5/18/1981 Semiconductors  
Common 
Stock   
TransCanada Corporation (TRP)
5/30/1985 Pipelines  
Common 
Stock   
Barrick Gold Corp (ABX)
2/25/1987 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock  
Abitibi-Consolidated, Inc. (ABY) 7/1/1987 Paper Products  
Common 
Stock   
Placer Dome Inc. (PDG)
8/13/1987 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock  
Domtar Inc. (DTC)
9/22/1987 Paper Products  
Common 
Stock   
Intertan Inc. (ITN)
11/1/1988 Specialty Retailers 
Common 
Stock  
Potash Corporation of 
Saskatchewan Inc. (POT)
11/2/1989 Specialty Chemicals 
Common 
Stock  X   
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Magna International Inc. (MGA)
10/9/1992 Auto Parts  
Common 
Stock   
Glamis Gold Ltd. (GLG)
1/20/1993 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock   
Masonite International Corpoation 
(MHM)
4/2/1993 Building Materials  
Common 
Stock   
Bank of Montreal (BMO)
10/27/1994 Banks, Ex-s&l  
Common 
Stock  
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited (AEM)
11/22/1994 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock  
Goldcorp Inc. (GG)
6/16/1995 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock   
Petro-Canada (PCZ)
9/13/1995 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock  X   
RBC Financial Group (RY)
10/16/1995 Banks, Ex-s&l  
Common 
Stock   
Canadian National Railway 
Company (CNI)
11/17/1995 Railroads  
Common 
Stock  X
Quebecor World, Inc. (IQW)
12/7/1995 Industrial Services 
Common 
Stock  X   
Rogers Wireless Communications, 
Inc. (RCN)
1/11/1996 
Wireless 
Communications  
Common 
Stock  
Rogers Communication Inc. (RG)
1/11/1996 Broadcasting  
Common 
Stock   
Cameco Corporation (CCJ)
3/14/1996 Mining  
Common 
Stock  
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Royal Group Technologies Ltd. 
(RYG)
4/2/1996 Building Materials  
Common 
Stock  
Extendicare Inc. (EXEA)
5/16/1996 
Healthcare 
Providers  
Common 
Stock  
CanWest Global Communications 
Corporation (CWG)
6/4/1996 Broadcasting  
Common 
Stock  X   
Meridian Gold Inc. (MDG)
7/31/1996 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock   
Oppenheimer Holdings Inc. (OPY)
8/28/1996 
Investment 
Services  
Common 
Stock   
Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD)
8/30/1996 Banks, Ex-s&l  
Common 
Stock   
Agrium Inc. (AGU)
10/4/1996 Specialty Chemicals 
Common 
Stock  
Precision Drilling Corporation 
(PDS)
11/15/1996
Oil Drilling, 
Equipment & 
Services  
Common 
Stock  X   
Biovail Corporation (BVF)
12/12/1996 Pharmaceuticals  
Common 
Stock   
Ipsco Inc. (IPS)
12/31/1996 Steel  
Common 
Stock   
Four Seasons Hotels Inc. (FS)
2/7/1997 Lodging  
Common 
Stock  X   
Intrawest Corporation. (IDR)
3/25/1997 Lodging  
Common 
Stock  X
Suncor Energy Inc. (SU)
4/18/1997 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock   
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Suncor Energy Inc. (SUPRA)
4/18/1997 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Structured 
Product   
Talisman Energy Inc. (TLM)
10/16/1997
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock  
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce (BCM)
11/13/1997 Banks, Ex-s&l  
Common 
Stock   
Ritchie Bros Auctioneers Inc. 
(RBA)
3/10/1998 Industrial Services 
Common 
Stock  X   
Celestica Inc. (CLS)
6/30/1998 
Electric 
Components & 
Equipment  
Common 
Stock  X   
Shaw Communications Inc. (SJR)
7/1/1998 Broadcasting  
Common 
Stock   
Shaw Communications Inc. 
(SJRPRA)
7/1/1998 Broadcasting  
Structured 
Product   
Shaw Communications Inc. 
(SJRPRB)
7/1/1998 Broadcasting  
Structured 
Product   
NOVA Chemicals Corporation 
(NCX)
7/6/1998 
Commodity 
Chemicals  
Common 
Stock   
NOVA Chemicals Corporation 
(NCXPR)
7/6/1998 
Commodity 
Chemicals  
Structured 
Product   
NOVA Chemicals Corporation 
(NCXPRA)
7/6/1998 
Commodity 
Chemicals  
Structured 
Product   
TransCanada Pipelines Limited 
(TCAPR) 10/5/1998 Pipelines  
Structured 
Product   
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CGI Group Inc. (GIB)
10/7/1998 
Diversified 
Technology 
Services  
Common 
Stock   
The Great-West Life Assurance 
Company (GWL)
5/28/1999 
Investment 
Products  
Structured 
Product   
Brookfield Properties Corporation 
(BPO)
6/2/1999 Real Estate  
Common 
Stock  
Intertape Polymer Group Inc. (ITP)
8/16/1999 
Containers & 
Packaging  
Common 
Stock  
Gildan Activewear Inc. (GIL)
9/1/1999 Clothing & Fabrics  
Common 
Stock   
Magna International Inc. 
(MGAPRB)
9/23/1999 Auto Parts  
Structured 
Product   
Manulife Financial Corp. (MFC)
9/24/1999 Life Insurance  
Common 
Stock  X
Sun Life Financial, Inc. (SLF)
3/23/2000 Life Insurance  
Common 
Stock   
MDS Inc. (MDZ)
4/7/2000 
Advanced Medical 
Devices  
Common 
Stock  
Corus Entertainment, Inc. (CJR)
5/10/2000 Broadcasting  
Common 
Stock   
Canadian Natural Resources, Ltd. 
(CNQ)
7/31/2000 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock  
TELUS Corporation (TU)
10/17/2000
Fixed-line 
Communications  
Common 
Stock  
11/14/2000 Secondary Oil Common  
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Nexen, Inc. (NXY) Companies  Stock 
Enerplus Resources Fund (ERF)
11/17/2000 Fund   
Brascan Corporation (BNN)
12/20/2000 Real Estate  
Common 
Stock   
Noranda, Inc. (NRD)
6/27/2001 Non-ferrous Metals 
Common 
Stock  X  X  
Kingsway Financial Services Inc 
(KFS)
7/11/2001 
Property & Casualty 
Insurance  
Common 
Stock  X   
EnCana Corporation (ECAPRA)
7/15/2001 
Major Oil 
Companies  
Structured 
Product   
TransAlta Corporation (TAC)
7/31/2001 Electric Utilities  
Common 
Stock   
Agrium Inc. (AGUPR)
9/15/2001 Specialty Chemicals 
Structured 
Product  
Cameco Corporation (CCJPR)
9/15/2001 Mining  
Structured 
Product  
Merrill Lynch Canada Inc. (HCH)
9/27/2001 
Investment 
Products  Basket   
Canadian Pacific Railway Limited 
(CP)
10/3/2001 Railroads  
Common 
Stock  
EnCana Corporation (ECA)
10/3/2001 
Major Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock  
Fairmont Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 
(FHR)
10/3/2001 Lodging  
Common 
Stock   
10/30/2001 Pipelines  Common  
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Enbridge, Inc. (ENB) Stock  
Pengrowth Energy Trust (PGH)
4/10/2002 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock   X
Bank of Nova Scotia (The) (BNS)
6/7/2002 Banks, Ex-s&l  
Common 
Stock  
The Thomson Corporation (TOC)
6/12/2002 Publishing  
Common 
Stock  X  
CAE Inc. (CGT)
7/29/2002 Aerospace  
Common 
Stock  
Cott Corporation (COT)
7/30/2002 Soft Drinks  
Common 
Stock   
PetroKazakhstan Inc. (PKZ)
9/12/2002 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Common 
Stock   
CHC Helicopter Corporation (FLI)
10/11/2002
Oil Drilling, 
Equipment & 
Services  
Common 
Stock   
PrimeWest Energy Trust (PWI)
11/19/2002
Secondary Oil 
Companies  Unit   
Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited 
(FFH)
12/18/2002
Property & Casualty 
Insurance  
Common 
Stock  
Kinross Gold Corporation (KGC)
2/3/2003 Precious Metals  
Common 
Stock  
Fording Canadian Coal Trust 
(FDG)
3/10/2003 
Investment 
Products  
Common 
Stock  
MI Developments Inc. (MIM)
8/20/2003 Real Estate  
Common 
Stock  
Nexen, Inc. (NXYPRB) 11/5/2003 
Secondary Oil 
Companies  
Structured 
Product   
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Pengrowth Energy Trust (PGH) 07/15/2004
Exploration/Product
ion Unit  
Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. 
(LGF) 08/09/2004
Broadcasting/Entert
ainment 
Common 
Stock  
Gerdav Ameristeel Corp. (GNA) 10/15/2004 Gold Mining 
Common 
Stock  
Kinross Gold Corp. (KGC) 12/06/2004 Steel common  
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Appendix 2. Canadian Companies Listed on the NASDAQ (1980-2003) 
 
Symbol Company Name Date Listed ADRs TSO 
STKL SunOpta, Inc. 11/17/1981 52,578,000 
NGAS Daugherty Resources, Inc. 4/12/1982 9,960,000 
LMLP LML Payment Systems, Inc. 6/24/1983 19,606,000 
SNDT Sand Technology Inc 4/15/1985 13,164,000 
CSLMF Consolidated Mercantile Inc 8/22/1986 4,864,000 
COGN Cognos Incorporated 7/1/1987 89,936,000 
QLTI QLT Inc. 10/25/1988 68,870,000 
MAMA Mamma.com Inc 11/10/1988 6,139,000 
QSND QSound Labs, Inc. 1/20/1989 7,162,000 
ABER Aber Diamond Corporation 3/20/1989 54,637,000 
DRAX Draxis Health Inc. 8/8/1989 37,099,000 
DYOLF Dynamic Oil & Gas Inc. 10/19/1989 20,273,000 
BIOM Biomira Inc. 11/19/1991 53,796,000 
MEOH Methanex Corporation 5/19/1992 119,578,000 
SSPI Spectrum Signal Processing Inc. 6/10/1993 14,732,000 
LBIX Leading Brands Inc 8/2/1993 14,729,000 
IDBE ID Biomedical Corporation 8/3/1993 36,111,000 
FBAY Frisco Bay Industries Ltd. 10/13/1993 2,207,000 
HUMC Hummingbird Ltd 4/25/1994 18,042,000 
IMAX Imax Corporation 6/10/1994 39,261,000 
ZICA Zi Corporation 6/17/1994 38,089,000 
CSPLF Canada Southern Petroleum Ltd. 10/20/1994 14,418,000 
WCST Wescast Industries Inc. 10/25/1994 5,707,000 
FSRV FirstService Corporation 1/20/1995 13,507,000 
CXSN Counsel Corporation 4/24/1995 48,602,000 
PAAS Pan American Silver Corp. 6/12/1995 43,883,000 
TSMA Tesma International, Inc. 7/27/1995 18,110,000 
BLDP Ballard Power Systems, Inc. 11/8/1995 115,789,000 
OTEX Open Text Corporation 1/24/1996 40,322,000 
AACB Alliance Atlantis Communications, Inc. 1/26/1996 38,923,000 
JCTCF Jewett-Cameron Trading Company 4/12/1996 1,460,000 
SSRI Silver Standard Resources, Inc 8/1/1996 30,914,000 
OPMR Optimal Robotics Corp. 10/25/1996 14,936,000 
MDSI MDSI Mobile Data Solutions, Inc. 11/26/1996 8,207,000 
TESOF Tesco Corporation 12/2/1996 34,343,000 
NGPS NovAtel Inc. 2/4/1997 7,685,000 
ALTI Altair Nanotechnologies Inc. 3/24/1997 40,217,000 
MXBIF MFC Bancorp Ltd. 5/14/1997 12,832,000 
TLCV TLC Vision Corporation 7/2/1997 66,112,000 
TONS Novamerican Steel, Inc. 10/31/1997 9,700,000 
NYMX Nymox Pharmaceutical Corporation 11/28/1997 23,021,000 
NICK Nicholas Financial, Inc. 12/30/1997 5,061,000 
DECA Decoma International, Inc. 2/24/1998 51,599,000 
DIIB Dorel Industries, Inc. 5/8/1998 26,347,000 
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TIWI Telesystem International Wireless Inc. 6/9/1998 93,434,000 
MDCA MDC Partners Inc. 10/2/1998 16,465,000 
DECT Dectron International, Inc. 10/6/1998 2,920,000 
ATYT ATI Technologies Inc. 11/24/1998 244,128,000 
DSGX Descartes Systems Group Inc. (The) 1/27/1999 52,225,000 
RIMM Research in Motion Limited 2/4/1999 91,720,000 
GSLI GSI Lumonics Inc. 3/24/1999 40,891,000 
CERI Capital Environmental Resource, Inc. 6/3/1999 38,445,000 
CREO Creo Inc. 7/29/1999 49,794,000 
PVTL Pivotal Corporation 8/5/1999 26,276,000 
WSTM Workstream Inc. 12/7/1999 22,446,000 
SVNX 724 Solutions 1/28/2000 5,983,000 
ANPI Angiotech Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 2/17/2000 82,408,000 
FMTI Forbes Medi-Tech Inc. 3/17/2000 27,064,000 
CRYP Cryptologic, Inc. 3/21/2000 12,246,000 
WEDX Westaim Corporation (The) 4/19/2000 78,033,000 
SWIR Sierra Wireless, Inc. 5/5/2000 20,102,000 
AELA AEterna Laboratories Inc. 5/10/2000 45,202,000 
ECGI Envoy Communications Group, Inc. 6/6/2000 21,259,000 
AXCA Axcan Pharma Inc. 6/30/2000 45,004,000 
EXFO EXFO Electro-Optical Engineering 6/30/2000 25,181,000 
IVAN Ivanhoe Energy, Inc. 8/28/2000 156,693,000 
HYGS Hydrogenics Corporation 10/27/2000 53,056,000 
EENC Enterra Energy Trust 1/10/2001 18,484,000 
DMCX DataMirror Corporation 1/18/2001 11,429,000 
HMSL Hemosol, Inc. 3/1/2001 46,104,000 
IAIA Intier Automotive Inc. 8/9/2001 6,302,000 
ONCY Oncolytics Biotech, Inc. 10/5/2001 24,552,000 
ALLSA Allstream, Inc. 4/1/2003 1,091,000 
SRXA S R Telecom Inc 9/3/2003 10,445,000 
NRMX Neurochem Inc 9/18/2003 29,592,000 
HUGO Ivanhoe Mines Ltd 11/18/2003 249,373,000 
VSGN Vasogen Inc. 12/17/2003 62,022,000 
GEAC GEAC Computer Corporation Ltd. 3/2/2004 84,778,000 
HMSL Hemosol Corp. 5/5/2004 15,171,000 
CRME Cardiome Pharma Corp. 6/7/2004 50,839,0000 
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Appendix 3.  Canadian Companies Filing S-1 (1994-2004) 
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Appendix 4.  Canadian Companies Filing 10-K (1994-2004) 
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Appendix 5.  Canadian Companies Filing 20-F (1994-2004) 
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Appendix 6. Canadian Companies Filing 40-F (MJDS) (2002-2004) 
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Appendix 7.  Canadian Companies Filing 40-F New Registration Forms 
(2002-2005) 
 
Company Name Province Registration Date 
Canadian Superior Energy 
Inc. 
Alberta 07/16/2002 
Pengrowth Energy Trust Alberta 02/22/2002 
Encana Corp. Alberta 02/28/2003 
Vermillion Energy Trust Alberta 07/02/2004 
Stantec Inc. Alberta 08/03/2005 
Norske Skog Canada Ltd. British Columbia 04/16/2002 
Northern Orion Resource 
Inc. 
British Columbia 12/09/2003 
Hummingbird Ltd. British Columbia 02/19/2003 
Novagold Resources Inc. British Columbia 10/29/2003 
Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. British Columbia 11/17/2003 
Nevsun Resources Ltd. British Columbia 08/02/2004 
Cardero Resource Inc. British Columbia 11/03/2004 
Formation Capital Corp. British Columbia 05/27/2005 
Silver Wheaton Corp. British Columbia 04/22/2005 
Gammon Lakes Resources 
Inc. 
Newfoundland  07/17/2003 
Bank of Nova Scotia Ontario 05/03/2002 
CAE Inc. Ontario 07/25/2002 
Iamgold Corp. Ontario 11/01/2002 
FNX Mining Co. Inc. Ontario 06/04/2003 
Research In Motion Ltd. Ontario 07/18/2003 
Orezone Resources Inc. Ontario 11/06/2003 
Yamana Gold Inc. Ontario 10/31/2003 
Gerdav Ameristeel Inc. Ontario 04/28/2004 
Cinram International Inc. Ontario 05/19/2004 
Banro Corp. Ontario 12/30/2004 
Glencairn Gold Corp. Ontario 01/21/2005 
Trizec Canada Inc. Ontario 04/29/2005 
